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STATEMENT OF APPELLATE COURT'S JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is properly in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j), 
and Utah R. App. Proc. 3 and 4. 
1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Appellate Court is to review the trial court's grant of summary judgment for 
correctness, and view all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. M&S 
Cox Investments, LLC v. Provo City Corp., 2007 UT App 315 1J 19; Kilpatrick v. Wiley, 
909 P.2d 1283, 1289 (Utah Ct. App. 1996.). The Appellate Court does not defer to the 
trial court's conclusion that the facts are undisputed nor its legal conclusions supported 
by those facts. M&S Cox Investments, 2007 UT App 315 ^ 19; Kilpatrick, 909 P.2d at 
1289. Summary judgment is only appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, and admissions, together with affidavits, show there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Wycalis v. Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821, 825 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), cert denied 789 P.2d 
33 (Utah 1990) {citing Amjacs Interwest, Inc. v. Design Assocs., 635 P.2d 53, 54 (Utah 
\9%\)){emphasis added.) 
The appellate court may affirm the trial court's judgment on any ground; even one 
not relied upon by the trial court, as long as the rationale for affirming that decision is 
supported by the record. Bailey v. Bayles, 52 P.3d 1158, 1161 (Utah 2002); White v. 
Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d. 1371, 1376 (Utah 1994.) Summary disposition of lawsuits is a 
valuable and necessary tool in our judicial system that assists in the efficient and timely 
resolution of legal disputes and granting summary judgment saves the parties and the 
court the time and expense trial. Wycalis, 780 P.2d at 824. 
2 
STATUTES DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-21.5 sets out the duties of a trustee, which include the 
preparation and execution of the cancellation of a notice of default. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31 sets out the procedure and requirements for allowing a 
trustor to reinstate a delinquent loan after the trustee has recorded a notice of default, and 
states that once a trustor has cured the default, the trustee may record a cancellation of the 
notice of default. 
3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On January 24, 2001 Alan J. Squires entered into a Note and first position 
Deed of Trust with IndyMac Bank, FSB {hereinafter "IndyMac" and "Indymac Deed of 
Trust") for a loan on property located at 2350 West Red Pine Court, Park City, UT 84098 
{hereinafter "the Property"). Indymac subsequently assigned its interest to Deutsche 
Bank National Trust Company {hereinafter "Deutsche"), although Indymac remained the 
loan servicer. (R. at 1-5.) 
2. First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc. {hereinafter "FSWT") was 
named trustee of the Indymac Deed of Trust. (R. at 4.) 
3. Alan J. Squires defaulted under the terms of the loan and FSWT recorded a 
Notice of Default on October 8, 2003. (R. at 4); See, ADDENDUM Exhibit A Notice of 
Default. 
4. Unknown to FSWT, on or about July 28, 2004, Deutsche and RJW Media, 
Inc. {hereinafter "RJW") entered into a Note Purchase and Sale Agreement wherein RJW 
purchased the indebtedness of Squires to Deutsche. (R. at 4; R. at 434); See, 
ADDENDUM Exhibit B Deposition Transcript of Nancy Blanco at 28:4-25, 29: 1-5. 
5. Unknown to FSWT, on July 28, 2004 Deutsche transferred its beneficial 
interest in the IndyMac Trust Deed to RJW by assignment {hereinafter "the 
Assignment".) (R. at 5; R. at 434; See, Addendum B at 28:4-25, 29: 1-5); See, 
ADDENDUM Exhibit C the Assignment. 
6. The Summit County Recorder recorded the Assignment on August 9, 2004. 
(R. at 5; See, Addendum C.) 
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7. RJW's attorneys Wrona & Parrish requested the recording of the 
Assignment. (R. at 323; R. at 410); See, ADDENDUM Exhibit D Deposition Transcript 
of Blake S. Parrish at Parrish Dep. at 58:24-25; 59. 
8. RJW's counsel delivered the assignment to the office of the Summit 
County Recorder for recording. (R. at 323; R. at 410.) 
9. The Summit County Recorder mailed the original recorded assignment to 
RJW's attorneys Wrona & Parrish. (R. at 254, Middlemas Aff., ffi[ 3-4; R. at 324); See, 
ADDENDUM Exhibit E Correspondence and Records of Summit County Recorder, 
Alan Spriggs. 
10. FSWT did not receive the original recorded Assignment from Summit 
County. (R. at 324; R. at 254, Middlemas Aff., ffi[ 3-4 & Ex. A-B; See, Addendum B at 
28: 4-25, 29: 1-5; see also, Addendum E.) 
11. RJW did not mail a copy of the Assignment to FSWT at the time it was 
recorded, and neither RJW nor its counsel called or communicated with FSWT to make 
them aware of the July 28, 2004 Assignment after it was recorded, until at least 
November 16, 2004. (R. at 254, Middlemas Aff., ffl| 3-4 & Ex. A-B; R. at 325; R. at 411; 
See, Addendum Bat 21:4-25; 22:1-17, 28:4-25, 29:1-5, 39:1-12, 41:2-5, 49: 1-8; see also 
Addendum D at 40: 24-25, 41:1-18, 62:2-5, 69:2-13); See also ADDENDUM Exhibit F 
Plf.'s Resp. to Def. FSWT's Req. for Admis. at 2-3. 
12. Indymac did not tell FSWT about the Assignment. (R. at 324; See, 
Addendum Bat 39:1-12.) 
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13. On or about September 22, 2004, Deutsche's servicer Indymac, through its 
foreclosure attorneys, instructed FSWT to record a cancellation of the October 8, 2003 
Notice of Default. (R. at 324; R. at 410; See, Addendum B. at 32:16-20, 33:8-17.) 
14. On or about September 22, 2004, FSWT recorded the Cancellation of 
Notice of Default (hereinafter "the Cancellation"). (R. at 324; R. at 410); See, 
ADDENDUM Exhibit G Cancellation of Notice of Default. 
15. FSWT was unaware of the Assignment or the change of beneficiaries when 
it recorded the Cancellation. (R. at 324; See, Addendum B at 39:1-12.) 
16. FSWT did not obtain a title report update before recording the Cancellation 
because it is not an industry standard to do so. (R. at 312, Smith Aff, \ 9; R. at 315, 
Davis Aff. \ 5; R. at 324; R. at 410; See, Addendum B at 33:20-25, 34:1-13, 46:25, 47:1-
7.) 
17. It is not the custom or practice for a trustee to obtain a title report before 
recording a Cancellation of Notice of Default or to question the authority of the purported 
beneficiary. (R. at 312, Smith Aff., fflj 8-9; R. at 315, Davis Aff., ffij 4-5; R. at 324; R. at 
410.) 
18. On or about October 28, 2004, S. Blake Parrish {hereinafter "Parrish"), 
RJW's former attorney, became successor trustee to the IndyMac Trust Deed, and FSWT 
was removed as trustee. (R. at 325; R. at 410.) 
19. RJW proceeded with non-judicial foreclosure of the IndyMac Trust Deed, 
culminating in a trustee's sale of the Property held on December 13, 2004. RJW did not 
update its title search before the sale, as is customary in the title and foreclosure industry, 
6 
and did not know about the Cancellation. (R. at. 325; R. at 411; R. at 313, Smith Aff, f 
11; R. at 315, Davis Aff., % 6.) 
20. Months after the sale, defendant and junior lien holder The CIT Group 
(hereinafter "CIT"), recorded its own Notice of Default to foreclose its junior lien, 
believing that the trustee's sale was void because of the Cancellation. (R. at 1-18.) 
21. RJW also became aware of the Cancellation, but instead of recording a new 
Notice of Default, RJW filed suit against CIT and FSWT to stop CIT's foreclosure sale, 
have RJW's trustee's sale declared valid, and obtain damages against CIT and FSWT. 
(R. at 1-18; R. at 326; R. at 411-412.) 
22. RJW filed its Complaint on July 20, 2005, and pled causes of action for 
Slander of Title, Injunctive Relief, and Breach of Duty against FSWT. (R. at 1-18.) 
23. RJW did not make a jury demand. (R. at 1-18.) 
24. RJW subsequently stipulated to a dismissal of its actions against FSWT 
for Slander of Title and Injunctive Relief, leaving only the cause of action for Breach of 
Duty. (R. at 52.) 
25. During the discovery phase, RJW took the deposition of FSWT employee 
Nancy Blanco. See, Addendum B. FSWT took the deposition of RJW's attorney and 
substitute trustee Blake S. Parrish. See, Addendum D. 
26. After discovery was complete, the parties filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment. (R. at 230-232; R. at 348-349.) 
27. In support of FSWT's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, FSWT 
submitted the affidavits of foreclosure attorneys Kathy A. Davis and Melven E. Smith 
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{hereinafter collectively wCthe Affidavits") to provide standard-in-industry evidence. (R. at 
311-316.) 
28. FSWT submitted evidence of the practice and procedure of the Summit 
County Recorder. (R. at 253-254; Middlemas Aff., Th 3-4 & Ex. A-B; See, Addendum 
E.) The correspondence and records of the Summit County Recorder stated that it was its 
practice to return a recorded document to the party who had requested the recording 
regardless of the instructions on the face of the document. See, Addendum E. 
Consequently, the Assignment was mailed to the office of RJW's attorneys and not to 
FSWT. (R. at 254, Middlemas Aff, ffi| 3-4 & Ex. A-B; R. at 324.) 
29. RJW did not provide counter-affidavits to dispute the Affidavits submitted 
by FSWT in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 409-416; R. at 433.) 
30. On September 18, 2006, the trial court heard oral argument of the parties 
concerning their respective motions for summary judgment. (R. at 713); See, 
ADDENDUM Exhibit H Transcript of September 18, 2006 Oral Arguments on Motion 
for Summary Judgment - Allocation of Fees. 
32. On September 22, 2006, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor 
of FSWT. (R. at 533); See, ADDENDUM Exhibit I September 22, 2006 Ruling and 
Order. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
RJW attacks the sufficiency and validity of the Affidavits for the first time on 
appeal, but RJW failed to preserve an issue concerning the Affidavits for appeal. The 
Utah Supreme Court forbids a party who failed to raise objections to formal or 
evidentiary defects in an affidavit supporting a motion for summary judgment before the 
trial court from raising those objections on appeal. RJW did not object to the sufficiency 
of the Affidavits in its various memoranda. Its brief remarks regarding the existence of 
the Affidavits in oral argument were not sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal 
because RJW did not timely object, raise a specific objection, or cite authority or 
evidence in support of its objection. 
RJW also failed to raise an objection to the use of the testimony of Kathy A. Davis 
and Melven E. Smith without designating them as experts, or providing expert reports. At 
no time did RJW address the issue of the use of experts or lay witnesses for standard-in-
industry evidence other than in passing in oral argument. Again, those remarks were 
insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal because RJW did not timely object to the use 
of the testimony, raise a specific objection, or cite authority or evidence in support of its 
objection. 
Summary judgment was appropriately granted to FSWT because although the law 
did not fix the standard of care, it was established factually by uncontroverted standard-
of-industry evidence. Because RJW failed to present counter-affidavits in opposition to 
those submitted by FSWT, which showed that FSWT acted reasonably within the bounds 
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of industry custom and standards, the trial court reached the reasonable conclusion that 
FS WT did not breach its duty as a matter of law. Utah law emphasizes the need for 
standard-of-industry evidence in negligence cases where a trade or profession is 
concerned. 
Standard-of-industry evidence was particularly important here to understand why 
FSWT recorded the Cancellation and that its actions did not constitute a breach of duty. 
The undisputed evidence supported FSWT's contentions that it acted reasonably when it 
followed Indymac's instructions to record the Cancellation without questioning 
Indymac's authority, where it had no notice from either Indymac or RJW that RJW was 
the new beneficiary. 
RJW argues that the law did not fix the standard of care, but it also argues in the 
alternative that the standard of care was established by Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-21.5 and 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31, and case law cited. Neither Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-21.5 nor 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31 direct a trustee to seek the express permission of the 
beneficiary or to verify that a loan has or has not been reinstated before recording a 
cancellation of notice of default, nor do they provide a penalty for failure under the 
statute. Utah Code § 57-1-31 represents only one of several reasons to cancel a notice of 
default, and the policy behind the statute allows beneficiaries and trustees the flexibility 
to cancel notices of default where required, even when the default has not been cured. 
Even if FSWT had a duty to obtain RJW's authorization under Utah Code Ann. § 
57-1-31 before recording the Cancellation, FSWT could not reasonably have obtained 
RJW's permission when it did not know that RJW existed because neither Indymac nor 
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RJW had notified FSWT of the Assignment. Because RJW failed to establish the 
standard of care and establish facts to show that FSWT breached its duty, summary 
judgment was appropriate because RJW failed to meet its burden of proof and establish 
all elements of its cause of action. 
Even if an objection to the Affidavits or the use of the affiants' testimony had been 
preserved for appeal, the Affidavits were sufficient to provide the trial court with valid 
standard-of-industry evidence. Utah law emphasizes the need for standard-of-industry 
evidence to determine the standard of care, but does not require that experts testify to 
establish the standard of care. FSWT did not designate Melven E. Smith and Kathy A. 
Davis as experts because they did not state opinions and because expert testimony was 
not required to establish the standard of care. Rather, FSWT only needed to present the 
testimony of qualified witnesses who worked in the same trade or profession, which 
testimony was presented and was undisputed. Even if the court believed that the 
Affidavits constituted opinion, that opinion was allowable under Utah R. Evid. 701. 
Finally, RJW cannot argue that it was prejudiced by the use of the Affidavits. As 
the plaintiff, RJW could have produced its own expert testimony or invoked Utah R. Civ. 
P. 56(f). It would be a waste of judicial resources to remand this matter for further 




A. RJW failed to raise the issue of the sufficiency of FSWT's affidavits to 
the trial court and cannot raise those issues for the first time on appeal. 
RJW failed to preserve the issue of the sufficiency or validity of the Affidavits for 
appeal. (Appellant's Br. at 27-29.) An appellant may not raise issues or objections for 
the first time on appeal unless the appellant also argues plain error or exceptional 
circumstances, and articulates appropriate justification for failing to preserve an issue for 
appeal. State of Utah v. Winfield, 128P.3d 1171, 1177 (Utah 2006) (quoting State of 
Utah v. Pinder, 114 P.3d 551, 561 (Utah 2005)); West v. Case, 142 P.3d 576, 579 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2006). RJW has argued that the trial court committed legal error, not plain 
error, and it has not articulated why it failed to preserve the issue of the sufficiency of the 
Affidavits for appeal, such as exceptional circumstances. (Appellant's Br. at 2-3.) 
The Utah Supreme Court forbids a party from challenging an affidavit on appeal 
where it failed to move to strike or otherwise object to that affidavit before the trial court: 
"Formal or evidentiary defects in an affidavit in support or opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment are waived in the absence of a motion to strike or other objection." 
Pinetree Assoc, v. Ephraim City, 67 P.3d 462, 465 (Utah 2003)(quoting D&L Supply v. 
Saurinl 775 P.2d 420 (Utah 1989); Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 699 (Utah 
1985); Fox v. Allstate Ins. Co., 453 P.2d 701 (Utah 1969). Under Ephraim City RJW 
must have either made a motion to strike or objected to the sufficiency of the Affidavits 
in a manner that would have allowed the trial court an opportunity to rule on the issue, 
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and to correct the error asserted. 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat Inc., 99 P.3d 801, 813 
(Utah 2004); West 142 P.2d at 579; Ephraim City, 67 P.3d at 466. 
RJW did not provide meaningful notice of the issue to the trial court. In order for 
the trial court to have meaningful notice of an issue and to have the opportunity to correct 
an asserted error, the issue: 1) must be raised in a timely fashion, 2) must be specifically 
raised, and 3) the challenging party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal 
authority. 438 Main Street, 99 P.3d at 813 (citing Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. 
Peebles, 48 P.3d 968 (Utah 2002)). RJW did not file a motion to strike, therefore in order 
to preserve an issue as to the Affidavits it must have objected in a manner that satisfies 
the three elements articulated in 438 Main Street. 
RJW did not file or raise a formal objection to the Affidavits, nor did it move to 
strike the Affidavits. Instead, RJW simply did not respond to the Affidavits. There is no 
mention of the Affidavits in either RJW's Reply Memorandum Supporting RJW's 
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. at 397-401), or in its Memorandum Opposing 
FSWT's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 409-416.) 
While RJW did not mention the Affidavits in its various memoranda, it briefly 
mentioned the Affidavits at the September 18, 2006, oral arguments. In response to 
FSWT's arguments RJW's attorney Joseph Wrona stated: 
"With regard to First Southwestern Title, seems to me their—their arguments 
today are two fold. They challenged the breach and they challenged damages. First 
Southwest Title attempts to invoke an industry standard and they make the 
argument, 'Look, we have demonstrated an industry standard," and it then 
becomes incumbent on RJW Media to sort of present a counter-industry standard, 
and then we're going to have a battle of experts at trial, I guess. And there are 
certain types of cases where we have battles of experts about, you know, for 
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instance, whether malpractice occurs. But an affidavit of industry standard cannot 
overcome a legal duty or a statutorily imposed duty. When the law say you must 
do x, you must do y, you must do z, an affidavit from somebody saying c We don't 
do that; we've never really done that', that does not create a reasonable dispute of 
fact. So, if in fact we have a clearly articulated legal standard, frankly, you know, 
a hundred affidavits from a hundred experts cannot overcome that legal duty." 
(R. at 713, at 32:19-25, 33: 1-11; See, Addendum H.) 
RJW's comments failed to preserve an issue for appeal. 438 Main Street, 99 P.3d 
at 813. First, the issue was not raised in a timely manner. RJW only mentioned the 
Affidavits at oral argument, and at no time made mention of the Affidavits in its written 
memoranda. Second, RJW did not specifically raise an objection to the sufficiency of the 
Affidavits. Clearly, RJW does not agree with the effect of the contents of the Affidavits, 
but RJW did not object to any formal or evidentiary defect in the Affidavits. Third, RJW 
did not cite any legal authority or evidence in support of an objection to any formal or 
evidentiary defect in the Affidavits. 
RJW was under an evidentiary burden to produce counter-affidavits. Smith v. 
Four Corners Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 70 P.3d 904, 915 (Utah 2003). By failing to 
produce counter-affidavits to dispute the facts presented, the trial court had no choice but 
deem the standard-of-industry evidence undisputed. Because the trial court was left with 
no genuine issue of material fact, like the trial court in Ephraim City, the trial court here 
was justified in relying upon the uncontroverted Affidavits and it did not err in granting 
summary judgment to FSWT. 
B. RJW failed to preserve the issue of experts, expert designation, or the 
use of the testimony of Kathy A, Davis and Melven E. Smith for appeal. 
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RJW also failed to raise an objection to the use of the testimony of Kathy A. Davis 
and Melven E. Smith without designating them as experts, or providing expert reports. 
Once again, a party may not raise an issue or make an objection for the first time on 
appeal, (Appellant's Br. at 27-29), and an issue is only preserved for appeal if presented 
to the trial court in a manner that allows the trial court an opportunity to rule on the issue, 
West, 142P.3dat579. 
RJW did not meet the elements necessary to preserve an issue concerning 
"experts" for appeal. 438 Main Street 99 P.3d at 813. At no time did RJW address the 
issue of expert testimony other than in passing at the September 18, 2006 oral argument. 
RJW's attorney acknowledged that FSWT expected RJW to produce counter-affidavits 
and expressed concern over a potential "battle of experts." (R. at 713, at 32:21-25; See, 
Addendum H.) RJW never objected to FSWT's non-designation of Kathy A. Davis and 
Melven E. Smith or the use of their testimony, and did not provide any authority or 
evidence in support of an objection. 
C. The standard of care was established factually and under the 
undisputed facts FSWT did not breach its duty as a matter of law. 
Summary judgment was appropriately granted to FSWT because the standard of 
care was established factually by uncontroverted standard-of-industry of evidence. The 
fact finder reasonably concluded that FSWT did not breach its duty and was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. (R. at 533.) Summary judgment may be inappropriate 
unless the standard of care is "fixed by law" and reasonable minds could reach but one 
conclusion concerning a defendant's negligence under the circumstances. Wycalis, 780 
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P.2d at 826. However, determining the standard of care is necessarily a factual question 
and the standard of care may be determined where there is uncontroverted standard-of-
industry evidence, rather than in sole reliance on prior judicial decision or legislative 
enactment. Id., 780 P.2d at 826. Once the standard of care is established factually, and 
material facts are otherwise undisputed, reasonable minds may reach but one conclusion, 
even where the standard of care was not "fixed by law." 
Wycalis allows for an "as a matter of law" determination where there is 
undisputed standard-in-industry evidence that establishes the applicable standard of care. 
The Wycalis court held that it could not ".. .agree that the standard of care owed by 
Guardian to Wycalis is 'fixed by law' or even conducive to an 'as a matter of law' 
determination, especially in the absence of uncontro verted standard-of-the-industry 
evidence." Id., 780 P.2d at 826 {emphasis added). The Wycalis court went on to say: 
"The standard must be established factually.. .with an emphasis on standard-of-the-
industry evidence." Id., 780 P.2d at 826 {emphasis added.) Based on that, the trial court 
noted: "Wycalis therefore left the door open for the possibility that summary judgment 
may be appropriate where a case involved 'uncontroverted standard-of-the-industry 
evidence.'" (R. at 528.) 
Here, the trial court ruled that in fact the applicable standard of care was not "fixed 
by law", (R. at 526), but unlike the unsuccessful defendant in Wycalis, who failed to 
present standard-of-industry evidence in support of its summary judgment motion, FSWT 
had presented standard-of-industry evidence and had established the standard of care, (R. 
at 311-316; R. at 528). A movant need only present testimony of witnesses who work in 
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the same industry or profession to establish the standard of care. Ortiz v. Geneva Rock 
Products, Inc., 939 P.2d 1213, 1217 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) {citing Wessel v. Erikson 
Landscaping, Co., 711 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah 1985.)) (Plaintiff established the standard of 
care by uncontroverted evidence of two non-expert witnesses who worked in the same 
profession.) Here, the trial court was justified in determining that the standard of care 
had been sufficient established factually and that reasonable minds could not differ as to 
FWST's reasonableness because the standard-in-industry evidence was undisputed. (R. at 
528-533.) 
RJW did not submit counter-affidavits. (R. at 433.) RJW had the burden of 
producing counter-affidavits or equally meaningful evidence to oppose FSWT's Motion 
for Summary Judgment and present disputed facts. Poteet v. White, 147 P.3d 439, 441 
(Utah 2006); Johnson v. Hermes Assoc, 128 P.3d 1151, 1158 (Utah 2005); West, 142 
P.3d at 578 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) {citing Smith, 70 P.3d at 915.)) 
In Smith, the Utah Supreme Court held ".. .when the moving party has presented 
evidence sufficient to support a judgment in its favor, and the opposing party fails to 
submit contrary evidence, a trial court is justified in concluding that no genuine issue of 
fact is present or would be at trial." Smith, 70 P.3d at 915. When RJW failed to dispute 
the standard-of-industry evidence either by counter-affidavit or equally meaningful 
evidence, the trial court could only reach one reasonable conclusion as to FSWT's 
negligence that FSWT acted reasonably and did not breach a duty as a matter of law. 
RJW also failed to dispute specific facts supported by the Affidavits. In the 
statement of facts supporting FSWT's Memorandum Opposing RJW's Motion for 
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Summary Judgment and Supporting FSWT's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, 
FSWT stated: 
u15. FSWT did not obtain a title report update before recording the Cancellation 
because it is not an industry standard to do so. (Blanco Aff. at 33:20-25, 
34:1-13, 46:25, 47:1-7; Smith Aff., f 9; Davis Aff. K 5.)" (R. at 324.) 
In its opposing memorandum, RJW responded: "Undisputed." (R. at 410.) FSWT 
continued: 
"16. It is not the custom or practice for a trustee to obtain a title report before 
recording a Cancellation of Notice of Default or to question the authority of 
the purported beneficiary. (Smith Aff., ffi[ 8-9; Davis Aff, ffi[ 4-5.)" (R. at 
324.) 
RJW responded: "Disputed, insofar as the Trust Deed Statute imposes a clear duty 
upon a trustee to ensure that the debt underlying a trust deed has been paid and the 
default cured prior to a trustee's issuance of a cancellation of notice of default." (R. at 
410). RJW did not dispute undisputed fact number 16. The trial court commented on 
RJW's response to fact statement number 16: "...RJW disputed the statement only to the 
extent that the trust deed statute imposed a duty to ensure the default had been cured. 
RJW apparently does not dispute that the custom or practice is not to question the 
authority of the purported beneficiary...." (R. at 529.) RJW did not provide any 
additional evidence to dispute the customs or practices of the title industry. 
Just as in Wycalis and Ortiz, standard-of-industry evidence was particularly 
important here to understand what motivated FSWT to record the Cancellation. FSWT 
recorded the Cancellation after receiving instructions from Indymac, having had no 
notice that the beneficiary had changed by Assignment. (R. at 324; R. at 410). Indymac 
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had been the servicer of the Deed of Trust, and in accordance with industry standards, 
FSWT acted reasonably when it did not question Indymac's instruction or Indymac's 
authority to give those instructions, especially where it believed Deutsche to still be the 
beneficiary. (R. at 324; R. at 410; R. at 529-533.) 
FSWT also acted reasonably when it did not obtain a title search before recording 
the Cancellation. (R. at 312; R. at 315; R. at 324; R. at 410.) While an updated title 
search would have revealed the Assignment, it was not the industry standard or custom to 
obtain a title search before recording a cancellation of notice of default at the instruction 
of a beneficiary. The undisputed Affidavits established the standard of care and the 
reasonableness of FS WT's actions. Even drawn in the light most favorable to RJW as 
the non-moving party, the facts are still undisputed and the fact finder's conclusion was 
reasonable. 
RJW argues that the standard of care was not "fixed by law" under Wycalis. In 
the alternative it argues that the standard of care was established by Utah Code Ann. § 
57-1-21.5, Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31, and case law. (Appellant's Br. at 23-27.) In 
support of its argument that the standard of care was fixed by law, RJW cites Russell v. 
Lundberg, 120 P.3d 541 (Utah 2005). Russell is inapplicable because it deals with the 
duty between a trustee and trustor, not between a trustee and beneficiary. RJW also cites 
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253 (Utah 1989) and 
Five F, L.L.C. v Heritage Savings Bank, 81 P.3d 105 (Utah 2003) to establish that FSWT 
had a duty to RJW and was required to comply with the statutes. 
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negligence claim, Wycalis, 780 P.2d at 825 n.5, and which required RJW to prove an 
actual breach of duty by FSWT, Fields v. Daisy Gold Mining Co., 73 P. 521, 522 (Utah 
1903). By failing to dispute the standard-of-industry evidence or that FSWT acted 
reasonably, RJW failed to prove the element of a breach of duty in light of the factually 
established standard of care. The trial court was justified in holding that: "Since 
Southwestern Title did not have notice that Deutsche Bank was no longer the beneficiary, 
and the industry standard of care did not require Southwestern Title to question Deutsche 
Bank's instructions or do an updated title search, Southwestern Title did not breach its 
duty as trustee as a matter of law." (R. at 533.) 
D. The Affidavits were sufficient to present standard in the industry 
evidence and to factually establish the standard of care. 
Even if issues and objections cited by RJW had been preserved for appeal, the 
Affidavits were still sufficient to provide the trial court with standard-in-industry 
evidence and factually establish the standard of care. FSWT presented the Affidavits of 
Kathy A. Davis and Melven E. Smith, both seasoned attorneys working in Utah's title 
and foreclosure industry, as standard-of-industry evidence in order to establish the 
standard of care and show that FSWT acted reasonably within the industry. (R. at 311-
316.) The Affidavits were undisputed and the trial court reasonably concluded that 
FSWT did not breach a duty. (R. at 409-416; R. at 433; R. at 533.) 
Utah law emphasizes the need for standard of the industry evidence to determine 
the standard of care. Wycalis, 780 P.2d at 826. The Wycalis court concluded that where 
the standard of care was not "fixed by law", the standard of care must be established 
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factually by standard-in-industry evidence, Id., 780 P.2d at 826, and affirmed summary 
judgment against the defendant Guardian Title because it did not provide standard of the 
industry evidence, Id., 780 P.2d at 827. FSWT had no intention of making that same 
mistake and submitted the Affidavits to provide standard-in-industry evidence in support 
of its Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Affidavits are not expert testimony. FSWT was only required to present the 
testimony of qualified witnesses who worked in the same trade or profession. Ortiz, 939 
P.2d at 1217. The Ortiz court held ".. .that the standard of care in a trade or profession 
must be determined by testimony of witnesses in the same trade or profession...however 
Utah law does not require expert testimony to establish the standard of care in every 
negligence case." Ortiz, 939 P.2d at 1217. While Wycalis states that "Expert testimony 
may be particularly helpful in elucidating the standard of care applicable here..." and in 
other cases involving professionals, the Wycalis court did not go so far as to say that 
expert testimony was needed in all cases concerning a trade or profession, or that an 
expert is necessary is all cases involving a title company. Wycalis, 780 P.2d at 826 n.8 
{emphasis added.) The Wycalis court's underlying concern about the need for experts 
was that a jury would not be able to understand the duties owed by Guardian Title. Id., 
780 P.2d at 827. That problem is not present here. RJW Media did not make a jury 
demand, (R. at 1 -18), and the trial court, acting as fact finder, determined that it 
understood the standard of care and that the standard of care was established factually by 
uncontroverted standard-of-industry evidence, (R. at 529-533.) 
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court's order, was helpful to a determination of a fact in issue, namely whether the 
foreclosure industry required a trustee to question the instructions of a purported 
beneficiary. (R. at 529-533.) 
Finally, RJW cannot argue that it was prejudiced by the use of the Affidavits. As 
the plaintiff, RJW could have produced its own expert testimony to establish the standard 
of care, just as it was RJW's burden to establish all elements of its cause of action against 
FSWT. Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131, 135 (Utah 1989) (A plaintiff in a medical 
malpractice bears the burden of establishing the standard of care by expert testimony); 
Weber, 752 P.2d at 1367. RJW could also have resorted to Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f) at any 
time to request additional time to produce equivalent lay testimony or expert testimony 
and provide counter-affidavits. There was no valid reason for RJW not to produce 
counter-affidavits, unless it simply could not dispute the facts presented. The lack of 
material dispute justified the trial court's determination that the standard of care was 
factually established and that FSWT did not breach its duty. If this matter were to be 
remanded, the trial court would be faced with the same evidence and would have no 
choice but to reach the same conclusion. It would be a waste of judicial resources to 
remand this matter for further proceedings where the evidence presented to the trial court 
was uncontroverted. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing facts, argument, and authorities cited, Appellee First 
Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc. requests that this Court affirm the decision of 
the trial court to grant summary judgment to First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, 
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Inc. Pursuant to Utah R. App. Proc. 34, FSWT requests an award of its costs incurred in 
responding to RJW's appeal. 
Dated this ^Hday of October, 2007. 
CASTLE MEINHOLD & STAWIARSKI 
Mark S. Middlemas 
Attorney for Appellee First Southwestern Title Agency 
of Utah, Inc. 
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SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE, that a default has occurred under that certain Trust Deed dated 
January 19, 2001, executed by ALAN SQUIRES, the TRUSTOR, in favor of INDYMAC 
BANK, F*S.B., as BENEFICIARY, in which SIGNATURE TITLE was named TRUSTEE, 
but first Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc. having been substituted as Trustee by -t 
written Substitution of Trustee dated September 29, 20Q3. the Trust Deed having been 
recorded in the office of the County Recorder of SUMMIT County, State of Utah, on 
January 24, 2001 as Entry No. 005S1046, in Book 01350, at Page 01059 , of Official 
Records, all relating to and describing the real property situated in the County of SUMMIT , 
State of Utah, particularly described as follows: 
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SERIES 2002-A. 
That the default which has occurred is the breach of an obligation for which the trust 
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principal and interest payments since May 1, 2003 and each month thereafter. That there is 
now due and owing on said note the sum of $1,882,908.97 together with interest at the rate 
of 7.62500% per annum from April 1, 2003. There h also due all of the expenses and fees 
of these foreclosure proceedings. 
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secured thereby and has declared and does hereby declare all sums secured thereby 
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first duly sworn d*d acknowledge before me that she is the Assistant Vice President of the 
Successor Trustee and the signer of the foregoing Notice of Default. 
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1 > ' * -A-V1 * U ) ^ _ » } \ 
t/\h 
BK1574 PG1568 
* * TOTAL PAGE.02 * * 

CONDENSED TRANSCRIPT 
IN M i .(IDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
, , .jufJTY, STATE OF UTAH 
r i 
'hi TIT GROUP/CONSUMER 
FINANCE , INC. , a Delaware 
coruoration; and WESTLAND 
iIT : INSURANCE AGENCY, 
INi a Utah corporation, 
dbc LINCOLN TITLE TNSURAN' 
AGENCY, and FIR1 i 
SOUTHWESTERN Til i -••., 






AGENCY OF UTAH,INC 
:'it * L . D L " ft J 
April 7, 2006 * 10:03 
Location: Castle, Meinhold & Stawiarski 
102 West 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Reporter f y p .i-- ' i - n D '
 c
 1 i 3 C S R D D D 
801.532.3441 
[Court, LLC 
THE REPORTING GROUP 
TOLL FREE 877.532.3441 
170 South Main Street, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8410 
FAX 801.532.3414 
Nancy Blanco * April 7, 2006 21 
MR. COEBERGH: Yes, let's go off the 
record . 
(Off-the-record discussion.) 
Q. (By Mr. Coebergh) Back on the record. 
And at what point in time did -- if at all, did First 
Southwestern become aware that the beneficial 
interest of this Trust Deed had been assigned to RJW 
Media, Inc.? 
A. First Southwestern was never notified. We 
found out after legal counsel, after I was asked to 
have a date done, I guess, after the time you called 
us. I don't know who was called when. I wasn't a 
part of that. 
Q. Okay. 
A. But had no idea that RJW had an interest, 
Q. And just to clarify your answer, were you 
talking about when you personally first became aware 
that RJW was a beneficiary of this Trust Deed? 
A. Yes, personally. I mean, I had no idea. 
Q. And then just to clarify the record, do 
you know when First Southwestern became aware that 
RJW was a beneficiary of this Trust Deed? 
A. I don't have an exact date on that 
because nobody contacted First Southwestern Title. 
There was no contact from RJW. 
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marked as Exhibit 4 before today? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what is this document? 
A. Assignment of Trust Deed from Deutsche 
Bank to RJW, and attorneys -- you know, obviously 
there was an agreement between Deutsche and IndyMac. 
Q. And on the top of this document it states, 
"After recording, mail to: First Southwestern Title 
Agency of Utah . " 
A. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q. "102 West 500 South, Suite 300." 
A. Yes. 
Q. Which was the main office address --
A. Right. 
Q. - - that you gave to me earlier? 
As you sit here today, do you know if this 
document was actually sent to First Southwestern at 
or about July 30th of 2004? 
A. I don't know. It didn't come to me. 
Q. And do you know if it came to anybody at 
First Southwestern? 
A. I don' t. 
Q. And so you cannot tell me when anybody at 
First Southwestern first received this document? 
A. I can' t . 
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recorded this Cancellation of Notice of Default? 
A. Per instructions of our client, or the 
attorneys. 
Q. And who was First Southwestern's client at 
that time? 
A, Shapiro & Meinhold. 
MR. MIDDLEMAS: The client? 
THE WITNESS: Oh, the client was IndyMac 
Bank, but who was, I guess. 
Q. (By Mr. Coebergh) So the client was 
IndyMac Bank? 
A. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q. And Shapiro & Meinhold were the attorneys 
representing IndyMac Bank? 
A. Yes. I guess that's the way it works. 
Q. Now, do you know specifically whether the 
instruction to issue or record this Cancellation of 
Notice of Default came from IndyMac Bank or from the 
attorneys? 
A. Our instructions came from the attorneys. 
Q. Shapiro & Meinhold? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And do you know who at Shapiro & Meinhold 
gave that instruction? 
A. I don't have her name with me. It's on... 
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Q. Generally speaking, after receiving an 
instruction like this to record a Cancellation of 
Notice of Default, does First Southwestern conduct an 
independent investigation - -
A. Not with a cancellation. 
Q. Not with a cancellation? 
A. No. 
Q. Why not? 
A. Because a cancellation is saying the 
notice has either been -- they've either brought it 
current or it's been paid off and they're done with 
it, they've closing the file. There's no reason for 
us to do anything else. 
Q. Did this instruction or this letter 
containing the instruction to record the cancellation 
come from a local office of Shapiro & Meinhold? 
A. Yes. It's in our -- well, it's not here 
in Salt Lake, no. 
Q. Where was that office located? 
A. It's in Colorado Springs. 
Q. Does the Trustee's Sale Guaranty file that 
we have been discussing, does that file contain other 
additional letters from Shapiro & Meinhold? 
A. Probably the recording of when the first 
Notice of Default went on. That's it. No. I don't 
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A. No. 
Q. To your knowledge, has First Southwestern 
had any communications with RJW Media, Inc. at any 
point in time? 
A. No. 
Q. After First Southwestern received notice 
of this lawsuit, has any communication occurred 
between First Southwestern and IndyMac, any 
representative of IndyMac? 
A. No. 
Q. Any communication in that same time frame 
between First Southwestern and Shapiro & Meinhold? 
A. After the lawsuit? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And can you tell me, first of all, when 
did those communications take place? 
A. I believe after the lawsuit was filed, 
which was the fall of last year, I believe. I don't 
remember exact dates. It was brought to my attention 
if -- because I hadn't - - I didn't receive any 
paperwork or phone call that they would like us to 
conduct — to go up and re-investigate this property 
to see if what you were talking about was actually 
true, which we did. And we went up and conducted a 
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personally feel that First Southwestern adequately 
performed all of its duties in this case? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And why do you say that? 
A. We followed our normal procedures. If we 
receive a Cancellation of Notice of Default, we would 
definitely just record it. 
Q. But as I understand your testimony, you 
were not personally involved with those procedures as 
to this particular piece of property; is that 
correct? 
A. That' s correct. 
Q. It was Charlene Williams and somebody else 
on behalf of --
A. No. Charlene Williams wouldn't have had 
anything to do with it when the cancellation of the 
default came in. 
Q. So who at First Southwestern was involved 
at that time? 
A. At that particular time, the only person 
that I can see was the person that actually signed 
the document would have been Shauna Burke. 
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MR. COEBERGH: Let's go off the record 
real quick. Maybe take a three-minute break. 
(Break) 
(EXHIBIT-7 WAS MARKED.) 
Q. (By Mr. Coebergh) Ms. Blanco, we're 
almost done. 
A. Okay. 
Q. At least I am almost done. 
A. All right. 
Q. Could you please take a look at Exhibit 7, 
which is page 18. 
A. (Pause) 
Q. And, Ms. Blanco, have you ever seen this 
letter before today? 
A. I have not. 
Q. Do you know if that letter is contained in 
the Trustee's Sale Guaranty file? 
A. To my knowledge, it is not. 
Q. Do you know if this letter is contained in 
any other file within First Southwestern? 
A. No. 
Q. So you basically don't know if First 
Southwestern ever received this letter? 
A. I have - - no, I don ' t. 
Q. And I will still ask the question. Did 
CITICOURT, LLC 
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Shauna Burke or anybody else at First Southwestern 
have any communications, first of all, with anybody 
at I n d y M a c or Deutsche Bank after receiving this 
letter? 
A. To my knowledge, don't. 
Q. And you already testified First 
Southwestern never had any communication with RJW. 
A. As to my knowledge, that's correct. 
MR. COEBERGH: I think that's all I have. 
Mr. Farmer still has questions. I don't know. 
MR. FARMER: Actually, I have a few 
questions, but it's not too complicated, nonetheless. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. FARMER: 
Q. My name is Dana Farmer and I'm the 
attorney in this matter for the other defendants, CIT 
Group and Westland Title dba Lincoln Title Insurance 
Agency. 
I want to make sure that I get a feel for 
your internal processes here so I understand what is 
going on. You received, did you -- when I say you, I 
mean First Southwestern Title. When First 
Southwestern Title Company was first contacted to 
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A. I don ' t . 
Q. All right. Looking at the document, can 
you identify who -- who is the seller in this 
document? 
A. Deutsche Bank. 
Q. And who is the buyer? 
A. RJW. 
Q. And who is the borrower? 
A. Alan Squires. 
Q. Can you generally describe the terms of 
the agreement? 
MR. COEBERGH: Objection. Vague and over 
broad. 
Q. (By Mr. Middlemas) What was the purpose 
of this agreement? 
A. The purpose of this agreement was to 
enable RJW Media to purchase the note that Alan 
Squires had issued to IndyMac Bank and obtain an 
assignment of the Trust Deed and lien on the 
underlying property. 
Q. Why did they want to do that? 
MR. COEBERGH: I'm sorry. That question 
calls for attorney/client privileged information. 
Q. (By Mr. Middlemas) Was a copy of this 
agreement provided, to your knowledge, to First 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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Southwestern Title at any time before you became the 
substituted Trustee on the IndyMac Deed of Trust? 
A. No. 
Q. Why was this not provided to First 
Southwestern Title? 
MR. COEBERGH: Objection. That question 
calls for attorney/client privileged information. 
Q. (By Mr. Middlemas) Who do you believe was 
the Trustee on the Deed of Trust? 
A. Let me restate my prior question. RJW 
Media did not provide a copy of this. I don't have 
any idea whether IndyMac Bank would have provided a 
copy of this to First Southwestern Title. 
Q. But it's your testimony that you did not? 
A. That RJW did not. 
Q. Did you as attorney or Trustee provide 
that document? 
A. No. 
Q. Can I ask why you didn't? 
MR. COEBERGH: Objection. Calls for 
attorney/client privileged information. 
Q. (By Mr. Middlemas) Who was the Trustee --
as you understand it, who was the Trustee at the 
time -- who was the Trustee on the Deed of Trust at 
the time that this document was executed? 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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that existed on the property, the lien, over to RJW 
Medi a. 
Q. And when was this document executed? 
A. It indicates here July 30th. 
Q. And recorded? 
A. The date stamp indicates August 9th. 
Q. At the top left of the assignment the 
document reads, "After recording mail to: First 
Southwest Title." Do you see that there? 
A. I do. 
Q. It also gives First Southwestern Title's 
address, does it not? 
A. Um-hum. (Affirmative). 
Q. Is it your understanding that after this 
document was recorded on August 9th that the 
assignment was mailed back to First Southwest Title 
or to Wrona & Parrish? 
A. To First Southwestern Title. 
Q. Okay. If you'll go down to the paragraph 
under the legal description. 
A. Um-hum. (Affirmative). 
Q. There is a time stamp for the recording. 
A. Um-hum. (Affirmative). 
Q. Who appears to be the requesting party 
under that time stamp? 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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A. Thi s law firm. 
Q. Okay. Is it your understanding that when 
a party -- as a Trustee, and having worked in real 
estate transactions, when you request the County 
Recorder to record a document is the document 
typically mailed back to the requesting party or 
another party? 
A. I'm not sure I understand the question. 
Q. When you request a document to be recorded 
from the County Recorder --
A. Um-hum. (Affirmative). 
Q. -- do they typically mail that document 
back to you as the requesting party or to the 
document -- or to the party noted? 
A. I think this is a question more 
appropriate for the County Recorder, but my 
experience has been they send the document to the 
party that's indicated on the document being 
recorded. 
Q. All right. Are you aware -- have you had 
a chance to review the requests for admissions? 
A. Uh-huh. (Affirmative). 
Q. Are you aware that your firm — I'm sorry, 
that RJW Media admitted that the document was 
actually sent back to Wrona & Parrish first? 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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A. Say that again. 
Q. After the Assignment of Deed of Trust was 
recorded did you have any further communications with 
Amy or anyone else at First Southwest Title? 
A. To my knowledge, no. 
Q. Okay. All right. Let's take a look at 
the next exhi bit. 
We'll mark this as Exhibit 7. It 
corresponds to page 24. And we'll have this marked 
as Exhibit Number 7. September 9th, 2004. Title 
commitment. 
What is this document? 
A. A Commitment for Title Insurance. 
Q. Have you seen this document before? 
A. Yes. 
MR. COEBERGH: Make sure you review all 
the pages. 
THE WITNESS: (Looking at document). Yes, 
Q. (By Mr. Middlemas) What is the date of 
this document? 
A. The date -- it has an effective date of 
September 9th. 
Q. And what is the purpose of this document? 
A, To indicate that -- the status of the 
title as of the effective date. 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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recorded. 
Q. (By Mr. Middlemas) Okay. To your 
knowledge, did First Southwestern Title mail a copy 
of this document to you? 
A. No. 
Q. What about to RJW Media, Inc.? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. Other than the communication you 
had with Amy, as of September 22nd, 2004, the date 
when this document was recorded, had you communicated 
with First Southwestern Title about the change of 
benefici ari es? 
A. There was a -- no. 
Q. Okay. And you stated that you first found 
out about the Cancellation of Notice of Default some 
months after the sale, is that correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. How many months would you say? 
A. When we received notice I believe it was 
in April. Almost five months. 
Q. What was your reaction? 
A. Surpri se. 
Q. What did you do about it? 






From: Alan Spriggs [aspriggs@co.summit.ut.us] 
Sent: Monday, May 08, 2006 11:22 AM 
To: Mark Middlemas 
Subject: RE: Assignment of Deed of Trust Doc. No. 00706979 
MR. MIDDLEMAS, 
OUR POLICY REGARDING THE RETURN OF RECORDED DOCUMENTS AS OUTLINED IN YOUR 
E-MAIL IS CORRECT. 
AS PER STATE STATUTE SUMMIT COUNTY MAINTAINS A FEE AND ENTRY INDEX SHOWING 
THE PARTY THAT REQUESTED THE RECORDATION OF A DOCUMENT AND THE RETURN TO 
NAME AND ADDRESS USED TO RETURN THE DOCUMENT. 




From: Mark Middlemas [mailto:mmiddlemas@LOGS.com] 
Sent: Friday, May 05, 2006 3:53 PM 
To: aspriggs@co.summit. ut.us 
Subject: Assignment of Deed of Trust Doc. No. 00706979 
Mr. Spriggs, 
Thank you for speaking with me today. Pursuant to our telephone conversation 
I am writing to ask you to confirm the information we discussed: 
1) It is the policy of Summit County to return the original recorded 
document to the party that requested the recording; 
2) This is typically true even if the document on its face says that once 
the document is recorded it is to be sent to another party; 
3) Summit County will send the original document to a recipient other than 
the requesting party if there is a self-addressed stamped envelope provided 
which is addressed to an alternative recipient; 
4) This policy was in effect in 2004. 
Specifically, I am trying to determine whether the original recorded 
Assignment of Deed of Trust (recorded August 9, 2004, No. 00706979 Book 1639 
Pg 0034, and requested by Wrona & Parrish) was mailed to Wrona & Parrish. It 
would seem according to the policy in effect that the original recorded 
document would have mailed to Wrona & Parrish. You mentioned that you may 
be able to find the mailing label if it still exists. Please let me know if 
that information is available. 
Thank you again for your time and assistance in this matter. 
Mark S. Middlemas 
> Castle Meinhold & Stawiarski 
102 West 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Tel. (801)533-5361 xll2 
Fax (801)961-9575 
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FROM PARTY NAME 
TO PARTY NAME 
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST 
RJW MEDIA INC 
DUTCH DRAW LOT: 0003 BLOCK: 
MISCHLER TERRENCE WYNN 
WHOM IT MAY CONCERN 
BEAR HOL VIL LOT: 0010 BLOCK: PLAT: 
RFC CONSTRUCTION FUNDING CORP 
FIEDSTONE COMMUNITIES INC 
WIL CRK EST LOT: 0055 BLOCK: PLAT: 
HALLIDAY PAUL M JR SUC TRUSTEE 
WITTENBERG STEVEN * 
PBRK COTT 1 BLDG: UNIT: 0043 WEEK# 
MATHESON STUART T SUC TRUSTEE 
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION 
JEREMY RCH B LOT: 1028 BLOCK: PLAT: 
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ROM: DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY 
TO: RJW MEDIA INC 
WRONA & PARRISH PC 
WRONA & PARRISH PC 
1816 PROSPECTOR AVE STE 100 
PARK CITY UT 84060-7481 
00706980 FROM: 
01639 00035 TO: 
REQUEST OF: 
RETURN TO: 
MISCHLER TERRENCE WYNN 
WHOM IT MAY CONCERN 
TERRENCE W MISCHLER 
TERRENCE W MISCHLER 
PO BOX 981253 
PARK CITY UT 84098 
ASSIG TRD 08-09-2 
07-30-2004 
COMMENTS: RE # 5.3104 6 
SUB/SURV: DUTCH DRAW 
08 -09-2 REL LN 
08-09-2004 
COMMENTS: REL # 68 792 
SUB/SURV: BEAR HOL VI 
00706981 FROM: 
01639 00036 TO: 
REQUEST OF: 
RETURN TO: 
RFC CONSTRUCTION FUNDING CORP 
FIEDSTONE COMMUNITIES INC 
FOUNDERS TITLE CO . 
FOUNDERS TITLE CO 
P O BOX 680845 
PARK CITY UT 84068 
00706982 FROM; 
01639 00037 TO: 
REQUEST OF; 
RETURN TO: 
HALLIDAY PAUL M JR SUC TRUSTEE 
WITTENBERG STEVEN 
WITTENBERG JENNIFER E 
FOUNDERS TITLE CO 
FOUNDERS TITLE CO 
P O BOX 680845 
PARK CITY UT 84068 
00706983 FROM: 
01639 00039 TO: 
REQUEST OF: 
RETURN TO: 
MATHESON STUART T SUC TRUSTEE 
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION 
FOUNDERS TITLE CO 
FOUNDERS TITLE CO 
P O BOX 680845 
PARK CITY UT 84068 
PAR REC 08 - 0 9 - 2 
0 7 - 3 0 - 2 0 0 4 
COMMENTS: RE # 6 0 2 2 7 0 
SUB/SURV-. WIL CRK EST 
0 8 - 0 9 - 2 NOT DEF 
0 8 - 0 3 - 2 0 0 4 
COMMENTS: RE # 5 S 3 5 4 0 
SUB/SURV: PBRK COTT 1 
TR'S DD 08 - 0 9 - 2 
0 8 - 0 3 - 2 0 0 4 
COMMENTS: RE 669226 B 
SUB/SURV: JEREMY RCH 
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COPY 
WRONA & PARRISH, P.C. 
Joseph E. Wrona (#8746) 
Bastiaan K. Coebergh (#7832) 
Tyler S.Foutz (#10855) 
1816 Prospector Avenue, #100 
Park City, Utah 84060 
Telephone: (435) 649-2525 
Facsimile: (435) 649-5959 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RJW MEDIA, INC, a Texas corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE CIT GROUP/CONSUMER 
FINANCE, INC. a Delaware corporation; and 
WESTLAND TITLE INSURANCE 
AGENCY, INC. a Utah corporation, d/b/a 
LINCOLN TITLE INSURANCE AGENCY, 
and FIRST SOUTWESTERN TITLE 
AGENCY OF UTAH, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSES TO 
DEFENDANT FIRST SOUTHWESTERN 
TITLE AGENCY OF UTAH, INC'S FIRST 
SET OF INTERROGATORIES, REQUEST 
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, 
AND REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION 
Case No. 050500373 
Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck 
Pursuant to Rules 33, 34 and 36 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff RJW 
Media, Inc. ("RJW Media"), by and through its undersigned counsel of record, hereby responds 
to Defendant's First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Jnc.'s ("FSWT") First Set of 
Interrogatories, Request for Production of Documents and Requests for Admissions as follows: 
INTERROGATORIES 
GENERAL OBJECTIONS 
RJW Media, by and through its counsel of record, objects to FSWT's First Set of 
Interrogatories insofar as they call for information which is protected from discovery by the 
Attorney-Client Communication and/or Work Product Privileges. No inadvertent production or 
disclosure of any privileged information or privileged document shall constitute a waiver of the 
applicable privilege. 
To the extent that any information requested in these discovery requests is not available 
to RJW Media or is equally available or accessible to FSWT, RJW Media objects to such 
discovery request. 
The responses contained in these Responses to Interrogatories are to the best ability and 
information of RJW Media. RJW Media reserves the right to supplement these responses after 
completion of discovery and/or to introduce evidence at the time of trial or hearing based upon 
information and/or documents located, developed or discovered after the date of these responses 
which evidence may supplement, modify or be in conflict with these responses. RJW Media 
acknowledges its continuing obligation to supplement his responses contained herein and 
reminds FSWT of the same responsibility. 
Any answers to these discovery requests which in whole or in part voluntarily provide 
information or refer to materials which may be inadmissible on any evidentiary ground are not 
intended as a waiver of any objection of any nature, including any applicable privilege, the 
discoverability or admissibility of any and all information and materials. Furthermore, RJW 
Media reserves its right to object to the admissibility or legal applicability of any such 
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information or materials provided during the course of other discovery, pleadings, motions or the 
trial of this matter. 
SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: State the full name of the Plaintiff, where and when 
Plaintiff was incorporated, where Plaintiff is licensed to do business, where it has its principal 
place of business and all names under which it does business. 
RESPONSE: Plaintiffs foil name is RJ.W. Media, Inc. The company is incorporated 
in Dallas, Texas. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: State the nature of Plaintiffs business, the number of 
Plaintiffs employees, and the approximate annual gross revenue of Plaintiff s business. 
RESPONSE: Objection. Interrogatory No. 2 calls for information beyond the scope of 
discovery, is not reasonably relevant to the matters at hand, seeks information that is cumulative, 
unduly burdensome, and is intended to harass, annoy, and needlessly burden Plaintiff in its 
attempts to respond to FSWT's discovery requests. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Describe in detail Plaintiffs ownership interest in the 
Property, or if Plaintiff does not claim to own title to the Property, please describe in detail 
Plaintiffs relationship to the Property, and identify any documents supporting its ownership 
interest in the Property. 
RESPONSE: Plaintiff is the fee simple owner of the Property, having purchased the 
Property at the Trustee's Sale on December 13, 2004. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Describe in detail why FSWT is liable to RJW, and please 
state: 
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a. What, if any, specific conduct established a duty owed by FSWT to RJW; 
and, 
b. What, if any, specific conduct constituted a breach of an alleged duty 
owed by FSWT to RJW? 
RESPONSE: Objection. Interrogatory No. 4 actually consists of two (2) interrogatories. 
In addition, Interrogatory No. 4 requests that Plaintiff state legal conclusions regarding FSWT's 
legal duty to Plaintiff. Without waiving these objections, Plaintiff responds as follows: 
On or about July 28, 2004, RJW purchased the IndyMac Note and became the beneficiary 
under the IndyMeic Trust Deed; at that time, FSWT was the successor trustee under the Trust 
Deed. As trustee under the Trust Deed, FSWT owed a fiduciary duty to RJW, as the beneficiary 
of said deed, until the date that FSWT was removed from its position as Trustee. FSWT 
breached that duty to RJW by: (1) issuing a Cancellation of Notice of Default on or about 
September 20, 2004, without permission, authorization, or direction from RJW, the beneficiary 
under the IndyMac Trust Deed; and (2) failing to give notice to RJW its unauthorized issuance of 
the Cancellation of Notice of Default. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Identify and describe the nature, source, and cause of any 
damages suffered, as of today's date, by RJW as a result of FSWTs alleged breach of duty. 
RESPONSE: All damages suffered by Plaintiff are not yet known or knowable to 
Plaintiff at this time, and may not be known until trial; Plaintiff reserves its right to amend 
damages provided herein as new information is discovered. Plaintiff will endeavor to 
supplement these responses as new information is discovered. Without waiving these objections, 
Plaintiff responds as follows: 
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FSWT's breaches have resulted in a cloud on the title of the property owned by RJW and 
Plaintiff has been forced to bring this action in order to protect itself against the attempted 
foreclosure by junior lienholder CIT. the expenses of that action, and any adverse consequences 
that result from the cloud caused by FSWT's breaches constitute recoverable damages. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: State the dollar amount of any damages, which you have 
suffered to date, as a result of FSWT's alleged breach of duty. If you have suffered no damages 
to date, please so state. 
RESPONSE: Plaintiff has suffered damages in an amount of at least $24,305.41 to date. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Identify and describe in detail the method you used to 
calculate the dollar amount of your damages. 
RESPONSE: The "method" used by Plaintiff to calculate damages involved the 
arithmetic summation of costs and attorney fees incurred by Plaintiff 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Identify all efforts you made to mitigate the damages 
described in your responses to Defendant First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc.'s 
Interrogatories 5-6. 
RESPONSE: Plaintiff attempted to convince CIT to withdraw its notice of sale. When 
that effort failed, Plaintiff sought and was granted an open-ended TRO enjoining CIT from 
conducting its sale. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Describe in detail any efforts made by you, S. Blake 
Parrish, the law firm of Wrona & Parrish, or as any other party of whom you have knowledge, to 
"date down" the Property's title at the time S. Blake Parrish became successor trustee on the 
Indymac Deed of Trust. 
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RESPONSE: Objection. Interrogatory No. 9 is vague and confusing, and Plaintiff is 
unable to ascertain FSWT's meaning by the undefined phrase "date down." 
INTERROGATORY NO, 10: Identify and describe the reasons why RJW did not 
record a Notice of Default after S. Blake Parrish became the successor trustee of the Indymac 
Deed of Trust. 
RESPONSE: Plaintiff was not required to record a Notice of Default. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Describe in detail any efforts made by you, S. Blake 
Parrish, the law firm of Wrona & Parrish, or of any other party of whom you have knowledge, to 
"date down" the Property's title after October 28, 2004 and prior to the December 13, 2004 
foreclosure sale. 
RESPONSE: Objection. See Plaintiffs Response to Interrogatory No. 9, above. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Identify the title search guarantee, or any title search 
document, used by you, S. Blake Parrish, or the law firm of Wrona & Parrish, to "date down" the 
Property prior to the December 13, 2004 sale, and identify the date that the document was 
produced, the person or entity that produced that document, and the name of any title insurer or 
other entity that guaranteed clear title prior to the December 13, 2004 sale. 
RESPONSE: Objection. See Plaintiffs Response to Interrogatory No. 9, above. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Identify and describe any and all efforts made by you, 
prior to the December 13, 2004 sale, to provide FSWT with notice of RJW's purchase of the 
Indymac Deed of Tmst and/or of the Assignment of Deed of Trust, and identify any evidence, of 
whatever kind, of your efforts to notify PS"\VT of RJW's purchase of the Indymac Deed of Trust 
and/or the Assignment of the Deed of Trust 
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RESPONSE: The Assignment of Deed of Trust was recorded by Park City Title on or 
about July 30, 2004. In addition, Plaintiff sent correspondence to FSWT informing it that Blake 
Parrish was substituted as Trustee on or about November 16, 2004. The Substitution of Trustee 
was executed by Plaintiff and provides: "RJW Media, Inc, is the Beneficiary under the Trust 
Deed pursuant to an Assignment of Trust Deed dated July 30, 2004, recorded August 9, 2004, as 
Entry No. 00706979, in Book 01639, at Page 000034, in the records of the County Recorder of 
Summit County, State of Utah." 
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Describe what specific conduct by you, FSWT, or the 
other parties to the sale made the December 13, 2004 sale valid. 
RESPONSE: FSWT, acting in its capacity as Trustee of the IndyMac Trust Deed and 
Note, filed a Notice of Default in Summit County on or about October 2, 2003. Blake Parrish, as 
successor trustee, relying upon the existing Notice of Default, as described more fully above at 
Response to Interrogatory No. 9, above, observed the notice of trustee's sale requirements set 
forth in Section 57-1-25 of the Utah Code by publication in the Park Record, a publication of 
general circulation in Park City, Summit Comity, State of Utah, posting a copy of the Notice of 
Sale on the property in question and posting the Notice of Sale in the Summit County Recorder's 
Office. In addition, Blake Parrish sent notice to all individuals holding an interest in the 
property, including CIT Group and Alan Squires. The trustee's sale was conducted by Blake 
Parrish as trustee in Summit County, Utah on December 13, 2004. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 15: Describe in detail when and how you, and your attorneys, 
became aware of the Cancellation of Notice of Default. 
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RESPONSE: Approximately five (5) months after completion of the Trustee's sale, 
Plaintiff received a copy of a Notice of Default filed by CIT Group's Trustee, Lincoln Title 
Insurance Agency. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 16: Identify all correspondence from you to FSWT, Indymac 
Bank, Deustche Bank, or their attorneys or agents. 
RESPONSE: Objection. Interrogatory No. 16 seeks information that is overbroad, 
cumulative, unduly burdensome, vague, and is intended to harass, annoy, and needlessly burden 
Plaintiff in its attempts to respond to FSWT's discovery requests. Interrogatory No. 16 is not 
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence; moreover, Plaintiff is not 
in a position to know all attorneys and/or agents of the parties identified in Interrogatory No. 16. 
Without waiving these objections and in the spirit of cooperation, Plaintiff volunteers the 
following information: 
A copy of the Substitution of Trustee was sent to FSWT. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 17: Identify and describe the reasons why RJW has not 
recorded a Notice of Default after December 13,2004. 
RESPONSE: Because Plaintiff had no obligation to do so. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 18: Identify any persons who prepared these answers and 
any and all sources used to do so. 
RESPONSE: All answers to these Interrogatories were prepared by Plaintiff and/or 
Plaintiffs Counsel All sources used to respond to these Interrogatories have been included 
pursuant to FSWT's Request for Production of Documents, below. 
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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
GENERAL OBJECTIONS 
RJW Media, by and through his counsel of record, objects to FSWT's First Set of 
Requests for Production of Documents insofar as these document requests call for information or 
documents that are protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege or any other 
privilege recognized by law, prepared in anticipation of litigation or trial, or which reflect mental 
impressions, conclusions or opinions or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a 
party concerning this action or otherwise. In responding to FSWT's document requests, RJW 
Media will not provide information or documents that are privileged, proprietary, confidential or 
otherwise immune from discovery. 
To the extent that any information or documents requested in these document requests is 
not available to RJW Media or is equally available or accessible to FSWT, RJW Media objects 
to such a document request. 
RJW Media further objects to FSWT's discovery requests to the extent that they call for 
production of documents and information that are not within RJW Media's possession, custody 
or control No objection made herein, or lack thereof, shall be deemed an admission by RJW 
Media as to the existence of any document. No statement that RJW Media will produce 
requested documents shall be deemed a representation that such documents exist, but rather that 
RJW Media will produce documents to the extent that they do exist and are in RJW Media's 
possession, custody or control 
The responses contained in these responses to Request for Production are to the best 
ability and information of RJW Media. RJW Media reserves the right to supplement these 
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answers after completion of discovery and/or to introduce evidence at the time of trial or hearing 
based upon information and/or documents located, developed or discovered after the date of 
these answers which evidence may supplement, modify or be in conflict with the responses 
contained herein. RJW Media acknowledges its continuing obligation to supplement its 
responses contained herein and reminds FSWT of the same responsibility. 
Inadvertent production of any information or document by way of these responses shall 
not constitute a waiver of any privilege or any other ground for objecting to discovery with 
respect to such document or such other document, or with respect to the subject matter thereof or 
the information contained therein, nor shall such inadvertent production waive the right of RJW 
Media to object to the use of any such document or the information contained therein during this 
or any subsequent proceeding. 
RJW Media reserves the right (1) to produce any document relating to the subject matter 
of a Request that is objected to on the grounds of burden, overbreadth or vagueness that would 
have been produced pursuant to a properly drawn Request relating to the same subject matter or 
that is produced pursuant to any other of the Requests; (2) to produce only the responsive 
portions of documents where such documents also contain information which is not responsive 
to a Request or is privileged; and (3) to produce documents as they are kept in its files and will 
not produce them with reference to a particular Request. The words "RJW Media will produce" 
or "RJW Media will supplement" certain documents called for by a Request will mean that RJW 
Media will produce only documents that are not withlield on the grounds of an objection, but the 
words shall not mean that such documents exist or are within RJW Media's possession, custody 
or control. 
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RESERVATION OF RIGHTS 
RJW Media reserves the right (1) to produce any document relating to the subject matter 
of a Request that is objected to on the grounds of burden, overbreadth or vagueness that would 
have been produced pursuant to a properly drawn Request relating to the same subject matter or 
that is produced pursuant to any other of the Requests; (2) to produce only the responsive 
portions of documents where such documents also contain information which is not responsive 
to a Request or is privileged; and (3) to produce documents as they are kept in its files and will 
not produce them with reference to a particular Request. The words "RJW Media will produce" 
or "RJW Media will supplement" certain documents called for by a Request will mean that RJW 
Media will produce only documents that are not withheld on the grounds of an objection, but the 
words shall not mean that such documents exist or are within RJW Media's possession, custody 
or control 
SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES TO 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
REQUEST NO. 1: All documents or things identified in, or used to respond to, 
Defendant First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc.'s interrogatory number 3. 
RESPONSE: See documents Bates stamped 44 to 46. 
REQUEST NO. 2: All documents or things identified in, or used to respond to, 
Defendant First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc.'s interrogatory number 4. 
RESPONSE: See documents Bates stamped 47 to 55. 
REQUEST NO. 3: All documents or things identified in, or used to respond to, 
Defendant First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc. s interrogatory number 5 
RESPONSE: No supporting documents provided. 
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REQUEST NO. 4: All documents or things identified in, or used to respond to, 
Defendant First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc.'s interrogatory number 6. 
RESPONSE: See documents Bates stamped 56 to 61. 
REQUEST NO. 5: All documents or things identified in, or used to respond to, 
Defendant First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc.'s interrogatory number 7. 
RESPONSE: Same as Plaintiffs Response to Request No. 4, above. 
REQUEST NO. 6: All documents or things identified in, or used to respond to, 
Defendant First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc.'s interrogatory number 8. 
RESPONSE: See documents Bates stamped 62 to 69. 
REQUEST NO. 7: All documents or things identified in, or used to respond to, 
Defendant First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc.'s interrogatory number 9. 
RESPONSE: Plaintiff does not possess any documents responsive to Request No. 1. 
REQUEST NO. 8: All documents or things identified in, or used to respond to, 
Defendant First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc.'s interrogatory number 10. 
RESPONSE: Plaintiff does not possess any documents responsive to Request No. 8. 
REQUEST NO. 9: All documents or things identified in, or used to respond to, 
Defendant First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc.'s interrogatory number 11. 
RESPONSE: Plaintiff does not possess any documents responsive to Request No. 9. 
REQUEST NO. 10: All documents or things identified in, or used to respond to, 
Defendant First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc.'s interrogatory number 12. 
RESPONSE: Plaintiff does not possess any documents responsive to Request No. 10. 
REQUEST NO. 11: All documents or things identified in, or used to respond to, 
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Defendant First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc.'s interrogatory number 13. 
RESPONSE: See documents Bates stamped 70 to 74. 
REQUEST NO. 12: All documents or things identified in, or used to respond to, 
Defendant First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc.'s interrogatory number 14. 
RESPONSE: See documents Bates stamped 75 to 80. See also Plaintiffs Response to 
Request No. 7, above. 
REQUEST NO. 13: All documents or things identified in, or used to respond to, 
Defendant First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc.'s interrogatory number 15. 
RESPONSE: See documents Bates stamped 81 to 83. 
REQUEST NO. 14: All documents or things identified in, or used to respond to, 
Defendant First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc.!s interrogatory number 16. 
RESPONSE: See Plaintiffs response to Request No. 4, above. 
REQUEST NO. 15: All documents or things identified in, or used to respond to, 
Defendant First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc.'s interrogatory number 17. 
RESPONSE: See Plaintiffs Response to Request No. 1, above. 
REQUEST NO. 16: All documents or things identified in, or used to respond to, 
Defendant First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc.'s interrogatory number 18. 
RESPONSE: No documents available. 
REQUEST NO. 17: Please provide a copy of the Special Warranty Deed, attached and 
marked as Exhibit H to your Complaint, showing the recording date and stamp of the county 
clerk. 
RESPONSE: See documents Bates stamped 84 to 86. 
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS 
REQUEST NO. 1: Admit that you did not mail a copy of the Assignment of Deed of 
Trust to FSWT prior to the December 13, 2004 foreclosure sale. 
RESPONSE: Admit that FSWT received notice of the assignment of the Deed of Trust 
in the Substitution of Trustee provided by Blake Parrish to FSWT. 
REQUEST NO. 2: Admit that after the Assignment of Deed of Trust was recorded, it was 
returned to Wrona & Parrish, and not FSWT. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST NO. 3: Admit that prior to the December 13, 2004 foreclosure sale, you never 
telephoned FSWT to inform FSWT of the Assignment of Deed of Trust. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST NO. 4: Admit that pursuant to the July 28, 2004 Note Purchase and Sale 
Agreement fl[ 5) you covenanted with Deutsche Bank to stop all collection activity against the 
borrower. 
RESPONSE: Deny. 
REQUEST NO. 5: Admit that pursuant to the July 28, 2004 Note Purchase and Sale 
Agreement flffl 9 and 11) that you agreed to indemnify Deustche Bank, its successors, assigns, 
attorneys and agents from all claims, losses, actions, damages, liabilities and expenses arising 
from, related to or in connection with the Property, the Loan Documents, or the Indebtedness. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
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REQUEST NO. 6: Admit that prior to the December 13, 2004 foreclosure sale, you never 
faxed, mailed or e-mailed to FSWT a letter to inform FSWT that RJW was the beneficiary of the 
Indymac Trust Deed. 
RESPONSE: Deny. 
REQUEST NO. 7: Admit that as of October 28, 2004, S. Blake Parrish of Wrona & 
Parrish was the trustee of the Indymac Deed of Trust. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST NO. 8: Admit that you did not mail a copy of the recorded Substitution of 
Trustee to FSWT. 
RESPONSE: Deny. 
REQUEST NO. 9: Admit that you did not "date down" at the time S. Blake Parrish 
became the successor trustee. 
RESPONSE: Plaintiff cannot admit or deny without clarification of the phrase "date 
down." 
REQUEST NO. 10: Admit that as of December 13, 2004, Wrona & Parrish represented 
you in the purchase of the Indymac Deed of Trust. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST NO. 11: Admit that as of December 13, 2004, you were the beneficiary of the 
Indymac Deed of Trust. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST NO. 12: Admit that S. Blake Parrish, Jr. did not inform you of the cancelled 
notice of default prior to the December 13, 2004 sale. 
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RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST NO. 13: Admit that no person identified as an attorney, agent, or employee of 
the law firm of Wrona & Parrish informed you of the cancelled notice of default prior to the 
December 13, 2004 sale. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST NO. 14: Admit that S. Blake Parrish did not "date down" prior to the 
December 13, 2004 sale. 
RESPONSE: Plaintiff cannot admit or deny without clarification of the phrase "date 
down." 
REQUEST NO. 15: Admit that S. Blake Parrish personally conducted the December 13, 
2004 sale. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST NO. 16: Admit that you were the successful bidder at the sale. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST NO. 17: Admit that the December 13, 2004 sale was valid. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST NO. 18: Admit that the December 13, 2004 sale was void. 
RESPONSE: Deny. 
REQUEST NO. 19: Admit that there is still an outstanding arrearage unpaid and in 
default on the Indymac Deed of Trust. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
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REQUEST NO. 20: Admit that since December 13, 2004, you have not recorded a 
Notice of Default on the Property. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST NO. 21: Admit that since December 13, 2004, RJW has not recorded a 
Notice of Trustee's Sale. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST NO. 22: Admit that RJW purchased title to the Property. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST NO. 23: Admit that the Special Warranty Deed, attached and marked as Exhibit H to 
Plaintiffs Complaint, is a conveyance of title to the Property to you fiom Spyglass Development IXC. 
RESPONSE: Deny. 
REQUEST NO. 24: Admit that RJW is the title owner of the Property. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST NO. 25: Admit that FSWT owes no duty to RJW. 
RESPONSE: Deny. 
REQUEST NO. 26: Admitthat RJW has no actual damages caused by FSWT. 
RESPONSE: Deny. 
REQUEST NO. 27: Admit that you paid $1,600,000.00 dollars forte Property. 
RESPONSE: Deny. 




REQUEST NO. 29: Admit that at the time of the execution of the Note Purchase and Sale 
Agreement prior you anticipated negotiating with CIT to obtain the release of its lien. 
RESPONSE: Deny. 
DATED this j J ^ j W of February, 2006. 
WRONA & PARRISH, P.C. 
z& 
Joseph E. Wrona 
Bastiaan K. Coebergh 
Tyler S. Foutz 
Attorneys for RJW Media, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of February, 2006,1 caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSES TO DEFENDANT FIRST 
SOUTHWESTERN TITLE AGENCY OF UTAH, INC.'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES, REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, AND 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION to be delivered via first class mail, postage pre-paid, to: 
Mark S. Middlemas 
Castle, Meinhold & Stawiarski 
102 West 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Dana T. Farmer 
Smith Knowles, P.C. 
4723 Harrison Blvd., Suite 200 
Ogden,UT 84403 
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WRONA & PARRTSH 
A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W 
March 10, 2006 
VIA FACSIMILE (801) 961-9573 
AND FIRST CLASS MAIL 
Mark Middlemas 
Castle Meinhold & Stawiarski 
102 West 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Re: RJW Media, Inc. v. CIT Group/Consumer Finance, Inc. et al 
Supplemental Discovery Requests 
Dear Mr, Middlemas: 
Pursuant to your letter dated March 6, 2006, Plaintiff RJW Media, Inc. 
supplements its Responses to Defendant First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc/s 
(hereafter "FSWT") First Set of Interrogatories, Request for Production of Documents 
and Requests for Admission in the following manner: 
1. Plaintiffs Responses have been verified as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 33(b), and 
such verification has been mailed to your office. 
2. Plaintiff supplements its response to Interrogatory No. 2 as follows: 
INTERROGATORY NO, 2: State the nature of Plaintiffs 
business, the number of Plaintiffs employees, and the approximate annual 
gross revenue of Plaintiff s business. 
RESPONSE: RJ.W. Media, Inc.'s sole business purpose is to 
hold real estate. RJ.W. Media, Inc. has no employees, and has no annual 
gross revenue. 
3. Plaintiff supplements its response to Interrogatories No. 9, 11, and 12 as follows: 
INTERROGATORY NO, 9: Describe in detail any efforts made 
by you, S. Blake Parrish, the law firm of Wrona & Parrish, or as any other 
party of whom you have knowledge, to "date down" the Property's title at 
1 
1816 Prospector Avenue, Suite 100 A Park Gtv, Utah 84060 * P h o n ^ ^ q fjLvw^ A C. 
the time S. Blake Parrish became successor trustee on the Indymac Deed 
of Trust. 
RESPONSE: Blake Parrish obtained a title report on or about 
September 9, 2004, which identified the existing Notice of Default issued 
by FSWT on or about October 2, 2003. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Describe in detail any efforts 
made by you, S. Blake Parrish, the law firm of Wrona & Parrish, or of any 
other party of whom you have knowledge, to "date down" the Property's 
title after October 28, 2004 and prior to the December 13, 2004 
foreclosure sale. 
RESPONSE: Mr. Parrish continued to communicate with Park 
City Title Company during that time period. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Identify the title search guarantee, 
or any title search document, used by you, S. Blake Parrish, or the law firm 
of Wrona & Parrish, to "date down" the Property prior to the December 
13, 2004 sale, and identify the date that the document was produced, the 
person or entity that produced that document, and the name of any title 
insurer or other entity that guaranteed clear title prior to the December 13, 
2004 sale. 
RESPONSE: See Plaintiffs Response to Interrogatory No. 9, 
above. 
Plaintiff supplements its response to Interrogatory No. 14 as follows: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Describe what specific conduct by 
you, FSWT, or the other parties to the sale made the December 13, 2004 
sale valid. 
RESPONSE: FSWT, acting in its capacity as Trustee of the 
IndyMac Trust Deed and Note, filed a Notice of Default in Summit 
County on or about October 2, 2003. Blake Parrish, as successor trustee, 
observed the notice of trustee's sale requirements set forth in Section 57-
1-25 of the Utah Code by publication in the Park Record, a publication of 
general circulation in Park City, Summit County, State of Utah, posting a 
copy of the Notice of Sale on the property in question and posting the 
Notice of Sale in the Summit County Recorder's Office. In addition, 
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Blake Parrish sent notice to all individuals holding an interest in the 
property, including CIT Group and Alan Squires. The trustee's sale was 
conducted by Blake Parrish as trustee in Summit County, Utah on 
December 13, 2004. 
5. Plaintiff supplements its response to Request for Production No. 4 as follows: 
REQUEST NO, 4: All documents or things identified in, or used 
to respond to, Defendant First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc.'s 
interrogatory number 6. 
RESPONSE: Objection. The documents originally provided by 
Plaintiff in response to Request No. 4 constitute invoices from Plaintiffs 
attorneys. Portions of these invoices contain information protected by the 
attorney-client privilege, and therefore all privileged information has been 
redacted from the documents. However, Plaintiff asserts that all invoices 
for fees provided to FSWT in response to Request No. 4 submitted 
constitute fees incurred by Plaintiff as a result of FSWT's actions. See 
documents Bates stamped 56 to 61 in Plaintiffs original responses. 
6. Plaintiff supplements its response to Request for Production No. 17 as follows: 
REQUEST NO. 17: Please provide a copy of the Special 
Warranty Deed, attached and marked as Exhibit H to your Complaint, 
showing the recording date and stamp of the county clerk. 
RESPONSE: Objection. Proponent is requesting a copy of a 
public record. Proponent is capable of obtaining this record, if one exists, 
from the Summit County Recorders Office. 
7. Plaintiff supplements its response to Request for Admission No. 1 as follows: 
REQUEST NO. 1: Admit that you did not mail a copy of the 
Assignment of Deed of Trust to FSWT prior to the December 13, 2004 
foreclosure sale. 
RESPONSE: Deny. 
8. Plaintiff supplements its response to Requests for Admission No. 9 and 14 
follows: 
3 
REQUEST NO. 9: Admit that you did not "date down" at the time 
S. Blake Parrish became the successor trustee. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST NO. 14: Admit that S. Blake Parrish did not "date 
down" prior to the December 13,2004 sale. 
RESPONSE: Deny. 
Dated: March 10, 2006 
Wrona & Parrish, P.C. 
Z^ 
Joseph E. Wrona 
Tyler S. Foutz 
Attorneys for RJW Media, Inc. 
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COMES NOW, First Southwestern Title Agency of Urah, Inc., Successor Trusirc, oi:d 
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6756S2r in Bock 1574, ^ t ? ^ c 1559 of Official Records of SUMMIT CCUSTV, S a^ic of Urrh 
covering the red property iocaicd in SUMMIT County, Sore of urrTi which is described -is 
follows: 
LOT 5r DUTCH DRAW AT CANYON ESTATES SUBDIVISION, PARK CITY, 
UTATL ACCORDING TO THE OFTICJAL PLAT THEREOF ON FILE IN THE 
OFFICE OF THE SUMMIT COUNTY RECORDER-
Tax Serial No. DDCE-3 
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First Southwestern Tlrlt Agency- of Utah. Inc. 
^ 
BY; _ / J k | i i 1 rr_i_k-j-~- - V ^ ^ ' N -
LORETTA K. ?0CE3 Asst. Vice Pres ide 0-
SHAUNA M. 3URKE: Asrl. Vic- Fresiacn: or 
NANCY BLANCO,. Assi. Vice President 
Successor Trustee 
STATE OF UTAE 
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First Suathwestem Title Agency of Utah, lac. Successor Trustee, who being Erst duly sworn 
did acknowledge before me that she is the SUCCBSSOT Trosiee and the signer of the foregoing 
CancellaiioD of Notice of De&ult 
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THE COURT: Good morning. We'll call the matter 
of RJW Media versus Southwestern Title and others. It's 
case 050500373. Counsel, state your appearances, please. 
MR. WRONA: Your Honor, Joseph Wrona on behalf of 
RJW Media. Attending with me is Tyler Foutz, one of my 
assistants. 
MR. FARMER: Dana Farmer on behalf of defendants, 
CIT Group Consumer Finance and Lincoln Title, Your Honor. 
MR. MIDDLEMAS: Mark Middlemas on behalf of First 
Southwestern Title Agency. 
THE COURT: All right. We have three motions 
today. Counsel, I think, in view of the day I have and the 
time we've allotted, I think, probably, I'll just want to 
hear from you on the summary judgment aspects, motion for 
allocation of fees. And I'll just consider that on the 
pleadings, and so, given that there are motions and cross-
motions, you really only have about ten minutes each on each 
of your motions. 
So I think we'll go ahead with the first in time, 
which was plaintiff's motion with regard to CIT and hear 
you two on that and then here Mr. Wrona and Mr. Middlemas on 
the Southwestern Title cross-motions. 
I've been through your materials, and, as always, 
1 i I'll take it under advisement. So, again, consistent with 
2 r what you want to tell me and the time we have, I think I 
3 j have a fairly fundamental understanding of the facts. But, 
4 of course, you may want to develop what you think's most 
5 j important. 
6 But Mr. Wrona, why don't you go ahead and then 
7 j I'll hear for you, Mr. Farmer, and then we'll leave that one 
8 I and hear from Mr. Wrona and Mr. Middlemas. 

















the issues really interrelate, and if it's more convenient 
for the Court from a timing perspective, I think I can 
probably, in about ten minutes, state my position on 
virtually the mass of motions. And then if I just have an 
opportunity for rebuttal — 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. WRONA: - that would be great. 
With regard to the two issues as RJW Media sees 
them, the pertinent facts are undisputed. First Southwest 
Title issued a notice of default while Indymac held a note 
in first position on a particular property. Indymac 
subsequently assigned that note to RJW Media. Subsequent to 
the assignment, First Southwest Title issued a notice of 
cancellation. Now, they issued that notice of cancellation 
without confirming that the default had been cured, without 
confirming that the trust deed had been reinstated, and, 
1 j obviously, from RJW Media's perspective, most importantly, 
2 j without obtaining consent of RJW. 
3 | I think that's sort of the first set of facts 
4 | that lead to the initial, you know, legal conclusion, which 
5 is that First Southwest Title issued a notice of 
6 ' cancellation without doing what it was supposed to do and 
7 I that it did not have authorization, legal authorization, to 
8 l issue the notice of cancellation. 
i 
9 | Then there's a second group of facts. After RJW 
10 ; obtained the assignment of the note and after RJW had 
11 ; confirmed that a notice of cancellation had previously been 
12 recorded — that a notice of default, excuse me, had 
13 
14 
previously been recorded, RJW issued a notice of sale. And 
it did all of the things that the statute requires of RJW 
15 Media to alert the world that a foreclosure sale is going to 
16 I happen. And it did everything it was supposed to do and it 
17 j did it right with regard to actually notifying the world of 
18 I the sale. 
19 | It's also- undisputed that RJW specifically 
20 | notified CIT of the sale. And it's also undisputed that CIT 
21 | and RJW actually engaged in communication about the sale. 
22 I It's undisputed that CIT chose to remain silent in 
23 j its communication with RJW about any perception on CIT's 
24 | part of some default in the notice of sale provision. And 
25 | it's undisputed that CIT chose to ignore the sale. Then 
1 I what happened in this case is the sale occurred, RJW Media 
2 acquired the property. CIT then waited several months and 
3 , then when the real estate market took off here, CIT decided 
i 
4 ! to attack RJW's title. 
5 That set of facts, I submit, is dispositive to the 
6 | claims against CIT and to First Southwest Title. 
7 Now, first of all, with regard to CIT. The 
8 American Falls case says — and this is — this is language 
9 I'm going to quote from the opinion: A mortgager may, by 
10 acquiescence and failure to assert rights at the proper 
11 | time, be estopped from attacking the validity of the sale. 
12 ' The Tim case then says: Irregularities in 
13 I technical notice are immaterial unless the objecting party 
14 demonstrates that it was unable to protect its rights. 
15 And I think that American Falls and Tim when read 
16 together are essentially — well, they're fatal to CIT. 
17 In it's opposition to our summary judgment brief — 
i 
18 | I mean, I recognize that CIT is trying to distinguish 
19 American Falls and is trying to portray the facts of 
20 American Falls as showing that a mortgager was doing over 
21 | things, and that set up the estoppel and waiver, and CIT 
22 J attempts to portray itself as — as not doing things. 
i 
23 | But, I mean, let's be clear that the appellate 
i 
24 I courts chose the language "acquiescence and failure to 
25 assert rights." That phrase very clearly says "doing 
nothing is what will set off the estoppel." 
And if the Court is ready to parse out the facts 
of the two situations, the American Falls situations and the 
CIT situation, I mean, the only really thing — the only 
thing that's really different between the two cases is that, 
in American Falls, the mortgager actually attended the sale 
and folded its arms and was quiet. In this case, CIT chose 
not to attend the sale. And it seems to me that factual 
distinction is really no distinction at all. It would allow 
a mortgagor to escape the law of American Falls simply by 
not attending the sale. And in — I mean, essentially, it 
would just turn American Falls into nonsense. 
With regard to what the Tim case says about 
irregularities being immaterial unless the objecting party 
is unable to protect its rights, clearly, CIT was in a 
position to protect its rights, knew about the sale, it 
could have attended the sale and it could have bid. 
Now, CIT, in its brief, raises an argument that 
somehow First Southwest Title's wrongful notice of 
cancellation had a chilling effect on the sale itself. And, 
again, that argument doesn't make sense to me. It seems to 
me there are two groups of potential purchasers that the 
Court needs to look at and assess whether that's a valid 
argument or not. And those two groups are lienholders and 
debtors, that's one group. People such as CIT and — and 
people such as the debtor, actually, who was foreclosed upon 
in this case. And then there's that second group which are 
third parties at large, the world at large. Obviously, in a 
foreclosure sale, it's to everybody's advantage to sell the 
property to the highest bidder. 
Now, with regard to the world at large, I think 
what's important here is that the notice of the sale itself, 
the announcements to the world, running the ads in the 
paper, recording the notice of sale, all of that was done 
properly. There has been no criticism about the notice of 
the sale. So the world at large knew about the sale. If 
somebody wanted to bid at the sale, all they had to do was 
show up and bid. The sale was happening. 
The only people that really would be potentially 
affected by the notice of cancellation would be the original 
debtor and, potentially, CIT. And, yet, it's undisputed 
here that CIT knew about the sale, and it's undisputed here 
that the original debtor knew about the sale. So there 
really is no legitimate argument that somehow this sale was 
chilled. 
There's one other interesting fact, Judge. If in 
fact that occurred, given that CIT was in the second 
position, a chilling of third-party interest would have 
actually worked to CIT's benefit; they would have been able 
to buy the property more cheaply. In a bidding war, if the 
price had gone up, if CIT wanted to pony up and take the 
property, they would have had to spend more. So, you know, 
what we have here, I think, is a situation where American 
Falls and Tim both state that, given these facts, CIT's 
claims just simply cannot survive summary judgment. 
Now, with regard to First Southwest Title, it 
seems to me there are two — two legal issues that have to be 
addressed. One is the standard of care. It's undisputed 
that First Southwest Title is a trustee. So the standard of 
care exists as a matter of law. I just don't think there's 
any court, at least in this state, probably in the United 
States that's going to take the position that a trustee does 
not owe a duty. 
And in this case that standard is defined by 
statute. What a trustee must do before it can issue a 
notice of cancellation properly is it has to show that the 
default has been cured and it has to show that the trustee 
has been reinstated. There's some debate in the briefing of 
the parties as to who the duty of care is owed to by First 
Southwest Title, whether it's owed to, for instance, RJW or 
whether it's owed to everybody out there. And I have a 
feeling — well, strike that. I stated that clumsy. 
The interesting thing, if it's owed to the world 
at large, RJW is a subset of the world at large; the duty is 
clearly owed to RJW. So no matter who the duty is owed to, 
1 • it includes RJW. And in this case, the duty wasn't — the 
2 | duty was not followed, the duty was breached. It was not 
3 ; cured. The trust deed was not reinstated. And, you know, 
4 j most importantly from RJW's perspective the notice of 
5 ! cancellation was issued without RJW's consent. 
6 \ When CIT attacked the title to the property — and 
7 j it wasn't attacked on title. Once CIT said, "We think we're 
8 ; entitled to take that property. We think we're entitled to 
9 j notice up a foreclosure sale," that's a cloud on title. At 
10 that point, that interferes with RJW's ability to do 
11 anything with the property. And the law says that, you 
12 | know, attorney fees are appropriate damages in that case. 
13 | And they are, from an equitable perspective, Judge, they're 
14 j appropriate in this case. 
15 RJW bought the property. RJW tried to talk to CIT 
16 | before the sale. RJW didn't want this lawsuit. RJW was not 
17 the aggressor in this situation. I mean, RJW's been forced 
18 to come to court and to engage in a — in a lot of 
19 I litigation. This is the briefing just, you know, that's 
20 i before the Court today just to protect its own title. So, 
21 I you know, I think that's another important consideration 
22 I with regard to First Southwest Title. 
23 | And I almost honored my commitment, Judge. Over 
24 j by a couple minutes. But those are my opening remarks. 
25 I THE COURT: Thank you. And let me hear, then, 
10 
from Mr. Farmer and then from Mr. Middlemas. 
Mr. Farmer? 
MR. FARMER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
Your Honor, we're here as a follow-up to a pending 
preliminary injunction on the enforcement of the trustee 
foreclosure on CIT's note, which, undisputedly was a second 
position note behind that of the note purchased by RJW 
Media. And as to their motion for summary judgment filed by 
RJW Media, they indicate that: 
"RJW has been damaged in its costs in bringing 
this action and other damages, this Court deems 
just for these reasons set forth more fully in the 
memorandum in support of this motion filed 
herewith. RJW moves that this Court grant the 
motion for summary judgment with respect to RJW's 
claims against defendant, the CIT Group, Consumer 
Finance Incorporated." 
As I read that, I don't see specific relief; I see 
that there's an allegation of some sort of damages. 
Referring over to the ninth page of their motion for summary 
judgment, in their point 4, saying summary judgment is 
appropriate, they state that all the material facts are 
established to prove that CIT has waived any right to 
challenge the trustee sale and that CIT is estopped from 
contesting the validity of the sale. 
And then again, down in the conclusion, "These 
facts establish as a matter of law that CIT has waived its 
right to contest the sale and that CIT should be estopped 
from contesting the sale," and then restating an indication 
of damages which are not quantified. 
Now, Your Honor, these are both equitable 
remedies, and in the complaint, RJW Media sets forth three 
causes of action against CIT. One is declaratory relief 
seeking a determination from this Court that we've waived 
rights and that we're estopped from enforcing our note and 
trust deed. 
The second one is a declaratory judgment seeking 
permanent injunction. 
The third is a sign or title claim also seeking a 
permanent injunction. 
So we're on a preliminary injunction now, but as 
we sit on summary judgment based upon the documents that are 
before the Court, they're not asking for a permanent 
injunction, which is their legal remedy. Instead, we're 
asking for equitable remedies based upon the principles of 
waiver of estoppel. And, Your Honor, we don't get two 
equitable remedies unless we've exhausted our legal 
remedies. The legal remedy available to RJW Media is a 
proper foreclosure of its trust deed. 
Now, RJW Media takes a position that they properly 
12 



















all the world. The problem, Your Honor, is that that sale 
3 , was undisbutably held based upon a canceled notice of the 
4 deed of — or the canceled notice of default. The canceled 
5 notice of default was recorded in the Summit County 
6 J Recorder's Office. As we've indicated in the briefing, RJW 
7 is asserting that they have the right to rely upon a 
separate notice system from that prescribed by the statutes 
9 i of the state, specifically those relating to trust deed 
foreclosure. Unlike mortgage foreclosure, this is not a 
judicial process. This is a non-judicial process. It's not 
a common law based type of a procedure, Your Honor, this is 
purely a statutory procedure. 
Statutory procedures are strict. Statutory 
procedures, like foreclosure of trust deeds, require 
compliance with the provisions in the statute so the people 
who have interest in the property can properly make 
decisions as to the relative rights that they have with the 
claims on title. That's why the trust deed statute clearly 
sets forth that the trustee does not have the authority to 
conduct a trustee's sale until they first record the notice 
of default. Without the notice of default on the record, 
the trust deed does not have any statutory authority to 
conduct a sale. In this case, the notice of default was 
25 I canceled on September 22nd, 2004, Your Honor, and a sale was 
held on December 13th, 2004. 
RJW says, "Well, that's of no consequence, Your 
Honor, because we let CIT know that we were going to go 
ahead with the sale and we published the notice of that 
sale." 
The problem with that argument is this, Your 
Honor: What is CIT supposed to rely upon? Is CIT supposed 
to rely upon the representations of RJW's attorney that it's 
going to have a sale and it considers the sale valid? Or is 
CIT entitled to rely upon the record at the Summit County 
Recorder's Office? 
According to the Summit County, the location where 
all documents relating to foreclosure sale are supposed to 
be recorded for public review; this notice of default has 
been canceled. And even if they have a sale, it's an 
invalid sale, because the authority is not there for the 
trustee to conduct the sale. That, Your Honor, is the 
reasonable conclusion, because this is a race-to-notice 
state. 
If I give you — if I sell you my property, Your 
Honor, if I quitclaim my property to you by deed today and I 
quitclaim my property by deed to Mr. Middlemas tomorrow, if 
he records before you record, he owns my property. Because 
under the race notice policy of this state, he was the first 
one to have his document recorded at the recorder's office. 
14 
1 , We can't ignore the significance of the record at 
2 J the Summit County Recorder's Office when evaluating the 
3 | relative rights of the parties in this case. The record 
4 | there was clear; the notice of default had been canceled. 
5 It's also clear from the trustee foreclosure 
i 
6 I statute that notices with respect to the foreclosure of 
7 » trust deeds are to be recorded at the recorder's office. 
8 You must record your notice of default. If you cancel, you 
9 must record your cancellation of the notice of default. 
10 j Why? So that people with an interest in the property have 
11 i notice of what's going on and can make a decision. 
12 RJW asserts that that process can be ignored and 
13 that a separate process which is not spelled out in the 
14 j statute can be applied to include that CIT has waived its 
15 I rights, because they had actual notice. That, despite the 
16 deficiencies in the public record, RJW Media was going to 
17 conduct a sale anyway. 
18 So on that basis, Your Honor, it seems to me clear 
19 that on December 13th, 2004, when Mr. Parrish conducted his 
20 foreclosure sale, he was without authority as the trustee 
21 I because there had been a cancellation of the notice of 
22 default. 
23 Now, getting back to the waiver argument, Your 
24 Honor, as we come here today with RJW arguing waiver and 
25 i estoppel, waiver, by definition, is the voluntary 
15 
relinquishment of a known right. The only right that CIT 
had in this property was a second position deed of trust. 
So if RJW Media wants to rely upon waiver for the basis of 
precluding us from enforcing our deed of trust, it is an 
absolute prerequisite that they establish that we had some 
legal right to enforce. The only legal right we could 
potentially have is our second-position trust deed. 
If their sale was valid, Your Honor, we donft have 
a deed of trust; it was eliminated with the sale in December 
of '04. So if they1re arguing waiver to the Court, they 
must concede that their sale was invalid. That's the only 
way that we have a legal right to waive. We can only still 
have a deed of trust on the property, Your Honor, if there 
was no valid foreclosure sale to begin with. 
Now, as to estoppel, estoppel requires that they 
show some sort of detrimental reliance upon some 
representation or upon some lack of representation that we 
should have made. And they rely upon the American Falls 
case and upon the Tim case for these arguments, Your Honor. 
CIT's position is simply this: CIT looked at the 
record. CIT received — excuse me, I'll back up. 
CIT received correspondence from RJW indicating 
that RJW Media was going to proceed with a sale in December. 
CIT also had the public record which said that the notice of 
default which Indymac had originally reported, had been 
16 
canceled by First Southwestern Title. CIT has a choice to 
make in that situation. Does CIT rely upon what's coming to 
it from RJW's attorney or do they rely upon the record? I 
think it's clear that they are entitled to rely upon the 
record, Your Honor. 
But do they have to communicate their intention to 
RJW Media? I think the answer is, very clearly, no, Your 
Honor. RJW Media is perfectly capable of searching title 
and determining the status of the notice of default. In the 
affidavit of Mr. Smith, which is — which is with the 
briefing, Your Honor, it clearly lays out that the proper 
procedure for conducting a foreclosure sale is to do a title 
search initially and then to do what's called a datedown, 
which is, 3 0 days before the sale, you search the title 
again to determine — sorry — tax liens from the IRS and so 
forth, Your Honor. 
There was no title searching done by RJW Media. 
RJW Media takes the position that "we can come in, we can 
assume we've got a valid notice of default, we can send out 
a sale, we can tell people in letters, which are not 
provided for in statute, that we're going to have a sale. 
We can ignore what's on the title and we can have our sale, 
and it's not going — and it's going to be a valid sale, even 
though there was a canceled notice of default." 
If they would have checked title, Your Honor, 
which a reasonable trustee would have done, they would have 
seen that the notice of default had been canceled, they 
could have recorded a new notice of default, noticed up the 
sale and had a perfectly valid sale. They didn't do that. 
It's not our obligation to tell them how to do 
their job. So I don't think that they can say that they 
7 I reasonably relied upon CIT's silence when they didn't even 
go and search title themselves. They're deemed to have 
knowledge of the canceled deed of trust, Your Honor, yet 
they want us to tell them that we're going to rely upon the 
deed of trust and not attend your sale. 
At what point does RJW have responsibility to act 
as a reasonable trustee, Your Honor, and not come into this 
court and say, "These guys have just ganged up on us and 
come in and making all these claims when we gave the whole 
world the notice that we were supposed to give by noticing 
up the sale," when they lacked the prerequisite valid notice 
of default, Your Honor? 
Finally, Your Honor, with respect to the chilling 
of the bidding, and then I'll conclude. 
The case law in chilling of the bidding is very 
simple. We don't have to prove that the bidding was chilled 
in fact; we have to choose the possibility — prove that it 
could have been chilled. That's the standard from the case 
law. 
18 
Mr. Wrona indicated that the cancellation of title 
really only affected those people who had some sort of a 
note on title, like CIT or First Southwestern Title and 
others. I disagree, Your Honor. 
If someone is going to go to a foreclosure sale 
and they are going to purchase property at foreclosure, they 
purchase the property without warranty. There are no 
warranties in the trustee's deed. So if I'm going to buy at 
a foreclosure sale and if I want to have valid title to that 
property, it is imperative that I determine that the trustee 
foreclosure procedure has been followed and that the money I 
spend is spent on quality title. Because if I don't buy 
quality title, the trustor, the person who's in default, can 
come back and get it from me, alleging deficiencies in the 
sale. 
A second-position lienholder, such as CIT in this 
case, can come in and invalidate the sale. And if I bought 
title based upon a canceled notice of default or a sale with 
no notice of default at all, I don't have any warranties 
from the trustee that I can rely upon; I've lost title to 
the property. So it's only reasonable to conclude that 
anyone who had an interest in purchasing the property and in 
bidding at this sale would conduct at least a brief search 
of title down in Coalville. And it's also reasonable to 
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5 i Unless the Court has any questions. 
i 
6 | THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Farmer. I think I 
7 J understand your position. 
8 Mr. Middlemas for Southwest Title? 
9 MR. MIDDLEMAS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
10 In response to RJW Media's motion for summary 
11 judgment, we would ask that it would be denied because there 
12 are genuine issues of material fact in dispute, specifically 
13 as to the reasonableness of First Southwest's action in this 
14 matter. Specifically, their notice concerning the 
15 assignment of trust deed, their notice concerning the change 
16 of beneficiaries, and, of course, whether or not RJW had any 
17 , actual — has any actual damages. In addition, there are 
18 questions as to the industry standards and customs. 
19 | These factual disputes, Your Honor, arise in part 
20 I from the affidavits of two seasoned foreclosure 
21 | practitioners which were submitted by First Southwest Title 
22 | and which RJW - to which RJW has failed to file any counter-
23 | affidavits as to the issues of standard of industry evidence 
24 ! and care. Those affidavits show that First Southwest Title 
25 | acted within the confines of the custom and standards of the 
20 
1 I industry and, in fact, that RJW's attorney and trustee, 
2 Blake Parrish, failed to act reasonably. 
3 Now, Your Honor, as no counter-affidavits have 
4 been filed, RJW cannot simply rely on its unsupported 
5 | averment at this stage to obtain summary judgment, and the 
6 j Court may deny RJW's motion simply because they have failed 
7 to establish genuine issues of material fact by responsive 
8 affidavits. 
9 I Your Honor, obviously, First Southwest Title is 
10 seeking dismissal in the form of — through their cross-
11 motion for summary judgment, and our argument is fairly 
12 simpLe. If First Southwest — or RJW Media is unable to 
13 prove all of the elements of its cause of action and there 
14 are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute, then 
15 their motion for summary judgment must be denied and First 
16 Southwest Title's motion for summary judgment must be 
17 granted. 
18 What are the elements? Well, Mr. Wrona has stated 
19 some of those elements. They must prove that there was a 
20 duty running between First Southwest Title and RJW Media, 
21 they must show that there was a breach of that duty by First 
22 j Southwest Title that recorded the cancellation of notice of 
23 default, and they must show that there were actual damages 
24 suffered as a result of that breach. 
25 I'm going to focus my arguments on the issues of 
21 
1 breach and damages because it is our contention that they 
2 , simply cannot prove those elements under the undisputed 
3 facts as they stand. 
4 I As to the issue of breach, RJW cannot prove breach 
5 because under the undisputed facts concerning industry 
6 standard, custom and care, First Southwest Title acted 
7 | reasonably. 
8 Now, RJW has argued two standards here. One, 
9 they've argued the statutory standard, which is that the 
10 ' cancellation could only be recorded once the default is 
11 j cured and reinstated. And we'll talk about that in a minute 
12 ! because that — that's not quite right. In addition, they've 
13 stated that there was a standard of reasonable care for a 
i 
14 ( trustee. Thus, (inaudible) the standard submitted by RJW, 
s 
15 | if First Southwest Title acted reasonably — and this is, of 
16 course, in light of industry standard and custom and the 
17 ' circumstances, under the case law submitted in the briefs, 
18 | the question becomes: Did First Southwest Title act 
! 
19 | reasonably when it reported the cancellation of notice of 
20 default? Did it act as any trustee would under the 
21 circumstances? And, of course, we're saying — we would urge 
22 ! the Court that, under the undisputed facts, they did. 
23 j And let's take a look at the circumstances. First 24 
25 
Southwest Title did not have any notice of the change of 
beneficiaries or the assignment of trust deed. This is 
22 




the assignment of trust deed to First Southwest Title. It's 
undisputed they didn't send them a copy of the note, 






















It is further undisputed that they did not receive 
notice in the form of the original time stamped copy. Now, 
this has been an issue in the — in the briefs, but it's come 
to light that RJW does not actually argue that First 
Southwest Title received that original recorded document, 
only that RJW did not receive it. And they have not — RJW 
has not disputed the records of the county recorder which 
clearly show that the assignment was mailed to Wrona and 
Parrish. 
First Southwest Title simply did not have notice 
of this - this change. So, consequently, they're arguing 
that - that we should have - that First Southwest Title 
shouLd have obtained authorization from RJW. They have no 
notice. They didn't know that RJW existed let alone that 
they were the new trustee. 
More importantly, because they didn't have notice 
of the change of beneficiaries, when they received 
instructions to record this cancellation of notice of 
default from Indymac Bank's attorneys, they had no reason to 
question Indymac's authority or to question whether or not 
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Indymac was still the beneficiary. There was no reason to — 
to question this. And this is absolutely consistent with 
industry standards. 
In the affidavit submitted to the Court from 
Melvin Smith and Kathy Davis, both seasoned foreclosure 
practitioners, it is neither industry custom or standard for 
a trustee to question a purported beneficiary when its 
received instructions to record a cancellation absent some 
notice that would — that would give them some indication 
that that would be incorrect. 
First Southwest Title did not obtain a title 
report before reporting the cancellation because, again, not 
the industry standard to do so. RJW has not disputed these 
industry standards. 
First Southwest Title acted as any other 
reasonable trustee would, considering they had no notice of 
the change. They did not breach their duty. 
Now, let's take a look at the statute, too. First 
Southwest's actions were reasonable in light of the statute 
which does not expressly state that they must seek the 
authority or the consent of the beneficiary. It does not 
say that, Your Honor. Nor does it provide a remedy in the 
statute for when that consent is not obtained or for when a 
notice of cancellation is recorded — or a cancellation is 
recorded in error. 
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Now, the statute says that it — they've emphasized 
that the statute says that a cancellation may only be 
recorded once the default is cured. But that's clearly not 
true in the commercial practice. For instance, if a notice 
of default is recorded on a property and it's recorded on 
the wrong property — for instance, they had the wrong legal 
description or a bad address — you've got to cancel that 
notice of default. Well, clearly, the underlying default 
hasn't been cured, but you didn't violate the statute 
because you removed that — because you canceled that notice. 
And this, Your Honor — it's interesting. It does 
not appear to be an oversight in the statute, where it 
states that there is no official — where there is no 
direction to seek authority. There are other statutes in 
that same chapter that specifically require the trustee to 
seek the beneficiary's approval; for instance, on deeds of 
reconveyance. And those statutes also provide extensive 
remedies for failing to do so. Those directions and 
remedies are simply absent in Utah Code Annotated 57-1-31, 
the applicable statute. 
It must be emphasized here, too, Your Honor, the 
statute certainly does not impose strict liability. And the 
mere fact that First Southwest Title recorded the 
cancellation is not in itself evidence of breach. In fact, 
the courts have rejected imposing strict liability simply 
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because the trustee has acted without the authority of a 
beneficiary. It's from the Wycalus case. 
Obviously, Your Honor, since First Southwest Title 
had no knowledge of RJW nor of the change of the 
beneficiaries, they couldn't seek their authority and they 
had no reason to question the authority of Deutsche. They 
did not breach their duty because they acted within the 
industry standards. 
Your Honor, it's also important to note that, 
throughout this litigation, RJW has actually argued that 
their sale is valid; despite the cancellation, they sale is 
valid. In fact, they've argued here today the Tim case in 
support of their argument that the notice — the cancellation 
is simply a — is immaterial to the validity of the sale, it 
was a technical defect. 
If the sale, then, was valid, then the 
cancellation had no actual effect on the sale or RJW's 
rights. RJW was able to foreclose the property and convey 
the property. If the sale is valid, then RJW accomplished 
the purposes of the trustee's sale. That means that the 
trustee's duty was fulfilled and it cannot — and First 
Southwest Title cannot have breached its duty. 
Well, Your Honor, even if the sale is deemed 
invalid here today, for the reasons expressed earlier, First 
Southwest Title still acted reasonably, given the 
1 circumstances and the industry custom. 
2 Now, let's take a look at the issue of damages. 
3 j It's the third cause — the third element of the cause of 
4 i action that they simply cannot prove. 
5 ; It is undisputed that RJW's damages are non-
6 ! recoverable because the only damages that they are arguing, 
7 the only ones that they've articulated, are attorneys fees 
8 incurred in bringing this litigation here. Now, under Utah 
9 law and the undisputed facts, RJW is barred from obtaining 
10 these attorneys fees. First of all, we have the American 
11 rule which states that you cannot obtain attorneys fees 
12 unless you have a contractual or statutory right. They have 
13 not disputed this and there's no evidence of a contract or a 
14 statutory right. 
15 There's also the — there's also Utah's economic 
16 loss rule, which states that, in cases of negligence — and 
17 in the White Palace case, we learned that breach of duty 
18 cases are treated as negligence cases — that a party may not 
19 I obtain damages purely for economic loss. 
20 Now, Your Honor, having remained silent on the 
21 American rule and the economic loss rule, they turned to 
22 their — their last bastion here of safety, and that is 
23 I trying to obtain these attorneys fees through Bass v. 
24 I Planned Management Services, stating that they can obtain 
25 these special damages for trying — for attempting to remove 
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a cloud on title. 
Your Honor, this line of cases, Dowse v. Doris 
Trust, Misco, Bass v. Planned Management Services, all of 
these cases present some serious problems for — for RJW, and 
here's why: 
First of all, a cancellation of notice of default 
is not a cloud on title. They have not presented any 
authority for that. It does not fit into any of the 
categories found in the case law, it's not a deed, a vesting 
instrument, it's not a claim for adverse interest or a lien. 
If there is a cloud on title, it would be CIT's 
notice of default, which is an instrument that was recorded 
challenging their right to possession while they are in 
possession. And that's important here, Your Honor. When 
this notice of — when the cancellation was recorded, RJW 
wasn't actually in possession of the property yet. Bass v. 
Planned Management Services, the court actually denied those 
attorneys fees as special damages because the defendants 
were not — or because the plaintiffs were not in possession 
of the property. 
RJW has not filed suit against First Southwest 
Title to actually remove the cloud on title. They've only 
asked for damages. Your Honor, if they prevail on their 
cause of action, it's not going to do anything to the 
cancellation of notice of default. It's not going to cure 
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this cloud. 
More importantly, and this is — this is the string 
that runs through all of those cases. Attorneys fees as 
special damages are only awarded in cases where, in addition 
to the successful action for cloud on title, they're also 
able to prove slander of title. It's a separate cause of 
action. Plaintiff must show — and this — again, in all of 
these cases it's the same, those special damages are granted 
because there was also a slander of title. 
Now, in this matter, RJW's slander of title action 
against First Southwest was voluntarily dismissed almost a 
year ago, on November 1st, 2005. They cannot prove a — they 
cannot and have not even attempted, really, to prove a 
slander of title action. Therefore, they cannot obtain 
those special damages that would be awarded as a result of 
that slander of title action. 
In short, their attorneys fees are barred by the 
American rule, the economic loss rule and by this line of 
cases. If attorneys fees are their only, damages and they 
have no way to recover those damages, they cannot prove the 
third element of their cause of action. 
Now, Your Honor, we have to state that, if there 
are any damages here — and this — this presents a genuine 
issue of material fact in opposition to their motion for 
summary judgment. If there are any damages here, they are a 
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result of the intervening failures of their attorney and 
trustee, Blake Parrish. Mr. Parrish, as trustee, took RJW 
Media to sale on a canceled notice of default. It's 
undisputed from the depositions, it's undisputed from the 
facts before the Court that he did not do a datedown, as — 
as Mr. Farmer explained, he did not update their title, he 
did not check it at the crucial junctures in which that 
needed to occur. Frankly, when it came to sale, he didn't 
know there was a cancellation. Mr. Parrish was in a 
position to prevent this litigation. He was in a position 
to prevent the damages. All he had to do was check the 
title and fix the problem. 
It is not equitable, Your Honor, to award 
attorneys fees to RJW Media when their own attorney and 
trustee, through his own intervening failures, caused any 
damages that they could allege. 
Again, Your Honor, RJW has continually argued that 
the sale is valid. If the sale is valid, then they were 
able to accomplish their goals and they simply have no 
damages. Their second and third causes of action are — are 
undisputed and unprovable. 
Your Honor, very quickly, just while we have a 
moment left, the Court also has a July 28th, 2004 note and 
purchase sale agreement before it. It's Exhibit A here. 
The Court has it in the briefings. But what I would just 
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like to say very quickly is that that — there's an 
indemnification agreement there which states that RJW agreed 
to hold harmless all agents of Indymac Bank. It's our 
contention that First Southwest Title was acting as an 
agent. Actually, Mr. Parrish, in his deposition, agreed 
with us that a — that a trustee does act as an agent. This 
is exactly the sort of problem, this cancellation of notice 
of default caused by the confusion is exactly the kind of 
problem that would be anticipated in an indemnification 
agreement that a seller would want to protect its agents and 
subagents against. 
In addition, it also states in that 
indemnification agreement that attorneys fees and costs must 
be denied or, more importantly, that they should be held 
harmless. Consequently, Your Honor, we believe that that, 
too, is a bar to their ability to obtain attorneys fees. 
In conclusion, Your Honor, the facts are 
undisputed here First Southwest Title did not have notice, 
First Southwest Title was not in position to do — to get the 
authorization. In addition, they followed the industry 
standard of care. Those facts are absolutely undisputed. 
The affidavits are there and they're uncontroverted. And we 
would ask the Court, then, to deny their motion for summary 
judgment and grant First Southwest Title's. 
Does the Court have any questions? 
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THE COURT: No. Thank you. 
MR. MIDDLEMAS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Mr. Wrona? 
MR. WRONA: Your Honor, with regard to CIT's 
arguments, I think I just want to respond very, very simply. 
If an unauthorized cancellation is capable of 
destroying an otherwise properly noticed foreclosure sale, 
then it would be the case that a sale could be knocked out 
virtually every time somebody records a notice of 
cancellation. 
There's no difference in this case between First 
Southwest Title recording a notice of cancellation and 
somebody from the street walking into the recorder's office 
and recording a notice of cancellation. The fact of the 
matter is First Southwest Title was not authorized to file 
the notice of cancellation when it did so. I mean, it 
really is just that simple. 
With regard to First Southwest Title, seems to me 
their — their arguments today were twofold. They challenged 
breach and then they challenged damages. First Southwest 
Title attempts to invoke an industry standard and they make 
the argument, "Look, we have demonstrated an industry 
standard," and it then becomes incumbent upon RJW Media to 
sort of present a counter-industry standard, and then we're 
going to have a battle of experts at a trial, I guess. And 
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there are certain types of cases where we have battles of 
experts about, you know, for instance, whether malpractice 
occurs. But an affidavit of industry standard cannot 
overcome a legal duty or a statutorily imposed duty. When 
the law says you must do X, you must do Y, you must do Z, an 
affidavit from somebody saying, "We don't do that; we've 
never really done that," that does not create a reasonable 
dispute of fact. 
So, if in fact we have a clearly articulated legal 
standard, frankly, you know, a hundred affidavits from a 
hundred experts cannot overcome that legal duty. 
The other thing I noticed in First Southwest 
Title's arguments, it's attempting to shift the burden. 
Southwest Title wants to contend that, gee, it didn't have 
any reason to ask whether it was proper to issue the 
cancellation. And First Southwest Title also argues that 
RJW was supposed to do all of these things that it didn't 
do, like, you know, notify First Southwest Title. But I 
just want to remind the Court, First Southwest Title was the 
trustee, RJW Media was the beneficiary. The duty flows one 
way, it doesn't flow both ways. 
First Southwest Title had an affirmative duty; RJW 
Media did not have a duty. First Southwest Title had a 
duty, as a trustee, and it breached that duty. The fact 
that First Southwest Title, you know, was put in a position 
33 
where it has to come into court and attempt to shift the 
burden demonstrates the weakness of its arguments. The 
argument that, "Gee, this is what we do in the industry all 
the time, ,f that just simply does not overcome the undisputed 
facts and the law that are present in this case. In fact, 
you know, if we were probably to sit here and think about 
it, we could come up with a lot of negligence cases that 
resulted in substantial jury awards where the excuse was, 
"We do it all the time." 
Now, with regard to the argument that the validity 
of the sale, I think I heard First Southwest Title say, 
"Look, they're taking the position the sale was valid. And 
if the sale was valid, RJW Media couldn't have been damaged 
by the cancellation notice." Well, the sale was valid, but 
we still have all of this damage. I mean, it's there in 
black and white. 
First Southwest Title invokes the economic loss 
rule, and that's a red herring as well. I've done a lot of 
litigation with the economic loss rule. An economic loss 
rule was stated in American Towers and in the progeny of 
American Towers, And what the economic loss rule states is 
that in situations of general negligence, tort damages won't 
be allowed if there was a contract in place between parties, 
unless there was an independent duty. That's the 
caveat: unless there was an independent duty. If that 
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caveat didn't exist — and it's been set forth by the courts 
repeatedly — that would let lawyers off the hook 
unilaterally and, think about it, in legal malpractice, 
because you sue for malpractice, that's a tort; you'd be 
able to invoke the economic loss rule and the — you know, 
the Lawyers in this state would be holding a party if that 
was the case. 
So the question here is: Is there an independent 
duty? They're a trustee; clearly, there is an independent 
duty. So the economic loss rule doesn't apply. 
They raised an argument that, somehow, Blake 
ParrLsh was an intervening cause. And itfs interesting 
because it seems to me their argument's defeated by their 
own earlier attempt to use an affidavit of industry 
standard. You know, whether — First Southwest Title is a 
title company and wants to take the position, "Gee, this is 
what lawyers are supposed to do," you know, the fact of the 
matter is there is no affirmative duty on Blake Parrish, 
who — pretty good lawyer and a very honest lawyer. I mean, 
and — and I have to concede, one of my closest personal 
friends. Even though he and I don't practice together 
anymore, we talk every week. 
Blake Parrish, when he took over the assignment of 
the note, confirmed that there was a notice of default on 






you know, "Gee, it was Blake Parrish1s job to datedown 
title, to datedown title." I mean, what, every week? Every 
day? Up until ten minutes before the sale? 
When Blake Parrish had done all of the things that 





















not have some affirmative duty. He was not an intervening 
cause here. 
And then, finally, now, with regard to this 
indemnification, First Southwest Title overlooks one thing. 
It was no longer an agent when it issued that notice of 
cancellation. That's the whole point here. 
So that indemnification, yes, when that document 
was signed, they were relieved of liability from anything 
they had done prior to signing that document. But they were 
not relieved prospectively. What they're attempting to do 
is to take the type of indemnification language that we 
commonly see in these types of agreements, and they want to 
use that as somehow a blanket indemnification for anything 
they did in the future. Something that says, "Okay, we're 
taking this property and we're agreeing to hold agents of 
you harmless for the things they have done." Doesn't allow 
those same people to go out and prospectively breach their 
duties and then invoke the indemnification clause. 
So, you know, the indemnification argument, the 
economic loss rule argument, the validity of sale, the 
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intervening cause, I mean, you know, First Southwest Title, 
we could see just by the cards they're throwing out one 
after the other after the other after the other demonstrates 
the weakness of their position. They don't really have a 
powerful argument. 
You know, with regard to the damages, you know, my 
client's incurred a lot of attorney fees and it didn't need 
to in this case. I think the Court understands — and I 
agree, you know, the way to handle the actual damage 
argument is subsequent to this hearing. I mean, the courts 
traditionally handle that through attorney fee affidavits, 
which, you know, we're happy to do. It's a painful 
exercise, but I realize that's just part of our job. 
Those are my comments, Judge. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, counsel. I 
appreciate your arguments. Again, I've — I've been through 
the materials. I'll do it again with some care and go over 
these arguments and get out a ruling soon. 
MR. MIDDLEMAS: Your Honor, can I give the Court -
can I give the Court one citation? 
THE COURT: Not in your pleadings? 
MR. MIDDLEMAS: No, Your Honor. It was -
Mr. Wrona stated that anyone could record a cancellation. 
Title 57, Chapter 1, Section 31 sets forth that to — it sets 



























trustee and must be signed by the 
Title was the trustee at the time 
THE COURT: All right. 
(Whereupon, at 9:50 a.m. 
trustee. First Southwest 
of the cancellation. 
Thank you, counsel. 
, the 
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THE CIT GROUP/CONSUMER 
FINANCE, INC., a Delaware 
corporation; WESTLAND TITLE 
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., a Utah 
corporation, d/b/a 
LINCOLN TITLE INSURANCE 
AGENCY; and FIRST SOUTHWESTERN 
TITLE AGENCY OF UTAH, INC., a 
Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
RULING and ORDER 
Case No. 050500373 
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: September 22, 2006 
The above matter came before the Court on September 18, 2006 
for oral argument on several motions. 
Plaintiff was present through Joseph E. Wrong/Tyler S. 
Foutz, defendants CIT Group and Westland Title were present 
through Dana T. Farmer, and First Southwestern Title was present 
through Mark S. Middlemas. 
The following motions were considered: 
1. Plaintiff RJW Media, Inc.'s ("RJW" or "Plaintiff") motion 
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for summary judgment and Defendant The CIT Group/Consumer 
Finance, Inc.'s ("CIT" or "Defendant") cross-motion for summary 
judgment; 
Plaintiff filed this motion for summary judgment on May 5, 
2006 and CIT filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on May 31, 
2006. CIT filed an opposition response on May 31, 2006 and 
Plaintiff filed an opposition response on June 9, 2006. 
Plaintiff filed a reply on June 2, 2006 and CIT filed a reply on 
June 21, 2006. A request to submit was filed by Plaintiff on 
July 7, 2006 and by CIT on August 10, 2006. 
2. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and Southwestern 
Title's cross motion for summary judgment. 
Plaintiff filed this motion for summary judgment on May 5, 
2006 and Defendant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on 
May 25, 2006. Defendant filed an opposition response on May 25, 
2006 and Plaintiff filed an opposition response on June 12, 2006. 
Plaintiff filed a reply on June 7, 2006 and Defendant filed a 
reply on June 22, 2006. A request to submit was filed by 
Plaintiff on July 7, 2006 and by Defendant on July 18, 2006. 
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3. Southwestern Title's motion for allocation of fees. 
Southwestern Title filed this motion July 21, 2006. 
Plaintiff filed an opposition response August 4, 2006. 
Southwestern Title filed a reply and request to submit August 11, 
2006. 
Oral argument was scheduled and held on September 18, 2006. 
The Court took the matter under advisement. 
The Court has reviewed the pleadings of the parties and the 
entire file, heard oral argument, and concludes as follows. 
1. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GIT'S CROSS MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
BACKGROUND 
It appears to the Court that the following facts are 
undisputed. On January 24, 2001, certain property in Park City 
(the "Property") was encumbered by a deed of trust ("IndyMac 
Trust Deed") executed in favor of IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. 
("IndyMac"). Subsequently, the Property was encumbered by a 
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second deed of trust executed in favor of CIT. In July 2004, 
IndyMac assigned its note relating to the Property to RJW. RJW 
thereafter performed a title search on the Property and 
discovered a Notice of Default had been recorded. Soon after, 
First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah/ the trustee of the 
IndyMac Trust Deed, issued a Cancellation of Notice of Default 
("Cancellation of Default"). RJW did not become aware that a 
Cancellation of Default had been filed until after it had 
foreclosed on the Property. CIT, however, became aware of the 
Cancellation of Default on November 9, 2004. 
On November 12, 2004, Blake Parrish, the new trustee of the 
IndyMac Trust Deed, issued a Notice of Trustee's Sale of the 
Property ("Notice of Sale"). The Notice of Sale complied with 
all statutory requirements and stated that the Property would be 
sold at the Summit County Courthouse on December 13, 2004 at 
11:00 a.m. 
On November 16, 2004, RJW mailed notice of the sale 
("Trustee's Sale") to CIT. Two days later, RJW mailed another 
letter to CIT informing it that the Trustee's Sale was noticed 
for December 13, 2004 and that RJW was willing to purchase CIT's 
trust deed in advance of the sale. RJW indicated in the letter 
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that it intended to conduct the foreclosure sale and clean off 
all encumbrances to the Property. 
CIT received the Notice of Sale and offer from RJW to 
purchase its trust deed, but CIT never responded to RJWs letter 
and never informed RJW about the Cancellation of Default or that 
CIT believed the impending Trustee's Sale would be invalid. On 
December 13, 2004, the Trustee's Sale was conducted in accordance 
with the Notice of Sale. CIT did not attend the Trustee's Sale 
and RWJ purchased the Property as the highest bidder. 
Following the Trustee's Sale, CIT received notice that the 
Trustee's Sale had in fact occurred. CIT did not take any action 
until April 2005, when it began the process of foreclosing on its 
own trust deed on the Property. On July 20, 2005, RJW filed the 
current action to, inter alia, enjoin CIT from proceeding with 
its foreclosure and for a declaratory judgment stating that RJW 
has title in fee simple to the Property free of any adverse 
claims from CIT. 
On August 31, 2005, RJW filed a motion for temporary 
restraining order and preliminary injunction asking the Court to 
enjoin CIT's scheduled foreclosure of the Property. The Court 
granted a temporary restraining order that would remain in effect 
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until further order. The Court now has before it RJWs motion for 
summary judgement and CIT's cross-motion for summary judgment. 
ARGUMENTS 
CIT claims that the Trustee's Sale that took place on 
December 13, 2004 was invalid because the Cancellation of Default 
had been recorded and therefore the statutory requirements for 
the sale were not met. Conversely, RJW claims that CIT is 
estopped from arguing the Trustee's Sale was invalid because CIT 
had notice the sale was going forward, but did not object or take 
any action to stop the sale. 
RJW claims in its motion for summary judgment that the 
undisputed facts show that CIT had actual notice of the Trustee's 
Sale and that it is estopped from objecting to the sale because 
CIT consciously chose to remain silent about the alleged 
procedural defect of the sale and allowed the sale to go forward. 
Alternatively, RJW argues that CIT has waived its right to object 
to the procedural defects of the sale. RJW relies on American 
Falls Canal Sec. Co. V. American Savings and Loan Ass'n for the 
proposition that a party who acquiesces in a foreclosure 
proceeding may be estopped from objecting to irregularities in 
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the proceeding. Pursuant to American Falls, RJW contends that 
CIT' s acquiescence in the foreclosure proceeding estops it from 
objecting to the validity of the sale. 
In further support of its argument, RJW alleges that the 
Cancellation of Default was simply a technical irregularity and 
that allegations of technical defects are insufficient to set 
aside a trustee's sale. A notice of default is a notice 
requirement and if the objective of the notice requirement is 
met, then defects in the notice will not affect the validity of 
the sale. The objective of the notice requirement is to inform 
persons with an interest in the property of the pending sale. 
Because CIT had notice of the sale, this objective was met and 
the sale was valid. 
RJW also contends that CIT cannot assert protection under 
Utah Code Annotated § 57-1-24 because the statute only protects 
debtors, not beneficiaries. Because CIT is not a debtor, it 
cannot object to the sale based on noncompliance with § 57-1-24. 
CIT filed an opposition to RJW's motion as well as a cross-
motion for summary judgment on May 31, 2006. CIT claims that 
contrary to RJW's claims, American Falls stands for the 
proposition that estoppel and waiver may only be used where there 
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is sufficient conduct by the party to be estopped. In American 
Falls, the Lender relied on extensive and affirmative conduct by 
the party that was estopped. In the current matter, CIT's only 
conduct was silence and RJW cannot claim reliance on CIT's 
silence because RJW should have easily discovered the 
Cancellation of Default by doing an updated title search. 
CIT further contends that the Cancellation of Default voided 
the trustee's authority to conduct the Trustee's Sale and 
therefore estoppel and waiver cannot be used to validate a void 
sale. CIT agrees that every notice defect and sale irregularity 
does not make the sale void, but contends that the test for 
whether a sale is void is whether the defect or irregularity 
would have the effect of chilling the bidding or causing an 
inadequacy of the price. CIT contends that the Cancellation of 
Default would have chilled the bidding and resulted in an 
inadequate price because the consequence of the Cancellation of 
Default was that there was no notice at all. 
CIT also reasons that the Cancellation of Default would have 
chilled bidding because people would either not attend the sale 
or not bid because the quality of title would be uncertain. For 
support, CIT points to the trustee's deposition where the trustee 
-8-
000498 
admitted that a reasonable conclusion for someone who saw the 
Cancellation of Default is that the sale would not be valid. The 
trustee also admitted that the sale may be invalid for those who 
did not have actual notice that the sale was moving forward 
despite the Cancellation of Default. 
CIT also contends that it acted reasonably by not bidding 
because if it had bid and won, it risked losing title to the 
Property because of the defective notice. The purpose of the 
notice system is to allow parties to rely on the predictability 
of the statutory notice process. If notice is effective even 
when the statute is not complied with, then the continuity and 
uniformity of the statutory process is harmed. Therefore, CIT 
was entitled to rely on the record at the County Recorder's 
office and the deficient notice voided the sale. 
RJW filed a reply memorandum to CIT's opposition on June 2, 
2006, as well as an opposition memorandum to CIT's cross-motion 
on June 9, 2006. RJW responds that estoppel may not only stem 
from a party's actions, but may also stem from a party's 
inactions. Because CIT received actual notice from RJW that the 
Trustee's Sale was moving forward and failed to take any action 
to stop the sale, CIT is now estopped from contesting the sale. 
-9-
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RJW further argues that CIT has not met its burden to show 
that bidding may have been chilled and that the price was 
inadequate. CIT has not contended that the price was inadequate 
nor has it produced evidence that the bidding was chilled. It is 
insufficient to allege that bidding may have been chilled, but 
one must show that the bidding was actually chilled. CIT has 
failed to do so. 
On June 21, 2006, CIT filed a reply memorandum to RJWfs 
opposition memorandum. CIT argues that by arguing estoppel and 
waiver, RJW has conceded that the Trustee's Sale was void. 
Because the sale was void, it cannot be validated by the 
equitable principles of waiver and estoppel. Nonjudicial 
foreclosures are governed exclusively by statute and if the 
statute is not complied with, the trustee has no power to conduct 
a sale, even in equity. Therefore, estoppel and waiver cannot be 
used to validate the sale. 
CIT also argues that it is not required to show that the 
bidding was in fact chilled, but simply that the Cancellation of 
Default would have the effect of chilling the bidding. CIT 
distinguishes RJW s cited cases on the basis that all of them 
deal with defects in the notice of sale and not with defects in 
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the notice of default. This distinction is important because the 
notice of default is what gives the trustee the statutory 
authority to conduct the sale. Without a valid notice of default, 
the trustee has no authority to conduct a valid sale. 
DISCUSSION 
Summary Judgment is appropriate only if the pleadings, 
depositions, affidavits, and other submissions reflect no genuine 
issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56©). The purpose 
of summary judgment "is to eliminate the time, trouble and 
expense of trial when upon any view taken of the facts as 
asserted by the party ruled against, he would not be entitled to 
prevail." Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975). 
A non-moving party who bares the burden of proof at trial must 
produce evidence sufficient to meet each element of their claim 
to preclude the entry of summary judgment. Sanns v. Butterfield 
Ford, 94 P.3d 301, 304 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). Bare contentions, 
unsupported by any specification of facts, are not enough. 
Massey v. Utah Power & Light Co., 609 P.2d 937 (Utah 1980). 
"Ordinarily, the issues of waiver and estoppel involve 
-11-
questions of fact or mixed questions of law and fact. Where, 
however, the facts and circumstances are admitted or clearly 
established and where only one inference may reasonably be drawn 
from the evidence . . . waiver and estoppel become questions of 
law." Am. Falls Canal Sec. Co. v. Am. Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 775 
P.2d 412, 415 (Utah 1989). The parties do not dispute the 
essential facts in this matter and therefore summary judgment is 
appropriate. 
The issue to be resolved is whether CIT's conduct estops1 it 
from objecting to irregularities regarding the notice of default. 
"Equitable estoppel requires proof of three elements: (I) a 
statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party 
inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (ii) reasonable action 
or inaction by the other party taken or not taken on the basis of 
the first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act; 
and (iii) injury2 to the second party that would result from 
1
 In addition to estoppel, RJW also argues that CIT waived 
its right to object to any irregularities in the Trustee's Sale 
and that even if it had not, the statute only protects debtors, 
not beneficiaries. Because the Court holds that RJWs estoppel 
claim is dispositive, the Court does not address RJWs waiver or 
standing claim. 
2CIT does not, at least expressly, dispute that RJW would be 
injured if CIT was now allowed to set aside the Trustee's Sale. 
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allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such 
statement, admission, act, or failure to act." Nunley v. Westates 
Casing Servs., 1999 UT 100, i 34, 989 P.2d 1077. Utah law is 
clear that the principles of estoppel may apply in the context of 
nonjudicial foreclosures. See Am. Falls Canal Sec. Co. v. Am. 
Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 775 P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1989) ("The 
principles of waiver and estoppel have application in determining 
the rights of parties to foreclosure sales.); Occidental Neb. 
Fed. Sav. Bank v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
("While such estoppel principles are most often applied in 
judicial actions, the facts and circumstances surrounding a 
nonjudicial foreclosure make the situations sufficiently 
similar."). 
CIT first argues that estoppel cannot apply to it because 
there was not sufficient conduct on its part. CIT distinguishes 
RJWs primary case, American Falls, based on the fact that the 
party's affirmative conduct in American Falls was more extensive 
than CIT's silent acquiescence. Although CIT successfully shows 
that its conduct is not as extensive as the affirmative conduct 
In any case, RJW would clearly be injured if it was required to 
go through the time and expense of another trustee's sale based 
on CIT's objection. 
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present in American Falls, it fails to show that its conduct was 
not sufficient for estoppel to apply. Estoppel not only applies 
to affirmative action such as in American Falls, but it also 
applies where there is failure to take action. See Nunley, 1999 
UT at 1 34 (listing failure to act as a way to satisfy the first 
element of estoppel); Am. Falls Canal Sec. Co., 775 P.2d at 414 
("A mortgagor by acquiescence and failure to assert his rights at 
the proper time may well be estopped to set up irregularities in 
the foreclosure proceedings to defeat rights of the purchaser.") 
(citation omitted)(emphasis added). 
It is undisputed that CIT acquiesced in the Trustee's Sale. 
CIT does not dispute that it was fully aware that the 
Cancellation of Default had been recorded and that it therefore 
had grounds to object to the sale.3 CIT assumes that its only 
option was to purchase the Property and therefore risk not having 
good title. Clearly, however, this was not CIT's only 
alternative. CIT was free to object to the sale based on the 
3CIT's argument that RJW could have easily discovered the 
Cancellation of Default misses the point. The relevant conduct 
for whether CIT should be estopped is CIT's conduct, not RJWs 
conduct. Regardless of whether RJW should have done an updated 
title search, the fact remains that CIT knew about the 
Cancellation of Default and chose to allow the Trustee's Sale to 
proceed without objection. 
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Cancellation of Default and ask the Court to enjoin the Trustee's 
Sale from taking place. Indeed, this is precisely the action RJW 
has taken with regard to CIT" s attempted foreclosure. However, 
rather than object or inform the trustee or RJW that it believed 
that the proposed sale would be invalid, CIT silently allowed the 
Trustee's Sale to take place. When CIT acquiesced in the sale 
with full knowledge of the Cancellation of Default, it gave up 
its right to later object after that sale had been completed. 
CIT argues that nevertheless the Trustee's Sale must be set 
aside because the Cancellation of Default voided the sale. 
Although CIT concedes that not every defective notice and 
irregularity in a trustee's sale makes the sale void, CIT is also 
correct that where noncompliance results in a ''complete legal 
nullity," the sale should be set aside. 
Notice defects or irregularities that would allow for 
setting aside a trustee's sale must be those "that would have the 
effect 1 chilling the bidding and causing an inadequacy of 
price." Timm v. Dewsnup, 2003 UT 1 , 1 36, 86 P.3d 699 (quoting 
Concepts, Inc. v. First Security Realty Servs., Inc., 743 P.2d 
1158, 1159 (Utah 1987). The reason for this requirement is that 
the "statutes regulating nonjudicial sales of property secured by 
O U f J i iH 
trust deeds are intended to protect the interests of the 
trustor/debtor in having the property sold for a fair price." 
Thomas v. Johnson, 801 P.2d 186, 188 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). If 
this objective is not met, then the trustee's sale should be set 
aside. Conversely, if this objective has been satisfied, then 
"immaterial errors and mistakes will not affect the sufficiency 
of the notice or the sale made pursuant thereto." Timm, 2003 UT 
at f 36. However, the remedy of setting aside a trustee's sale 
should only be applied in cases that reach unjust extremes. 
Concepts, 743 P.2d at 1159. 
CIT has failed to offer any evidence that the statute's 
objective was not met or that the Cancellation of Default 
resulted in chilled bidding or an inadequate price.4 CIT argues 
that it is not required to produce affirmative evidence of 
chilled bidding, but the cases indicate otherwise. See Concepts, 
743 P.2d at 1159 ("Defendant's statement that the incorrect date 
had the potential to mislead prospective bidders is insufficient 
to conclude that it in fact did."); Occidental/Neb. Fed. Sav. 
4
 The parties dispute whether the requirement to show chilled 
bidding or an inadequacy of price is conjunctive or disjunctive. 
This Court need not decide this issue since CIT has failed to 




Bank, 791 P.2d at 221 ("there was no evidence presented that the 
inaccurate description of the property . . . had any chilling 
effect on the bidding or resulted in an inadequate bid."). 
Moreover, even if CIT was correct that it does not have to 
provide evidence that the bidding was in fact chilled or resulted 
in an inadequate price, the Court does not find that the 
Cancellation of Default would potentially lead to such a result. 
If i!i I ndividual discovered a Cancellation of Default had been 
recorded, but also discovered a Notice of Sale indicating that a 
tr\ istee' s sa] e was going to be held, :i I: :i s i 1.1 i ] ike 1 y that the 
individual would simply assume that the resulting sale would be 
inva] :i d and do nothing more. At a minimum, the :i ndividual would 
call the trustee to inquire further as to the discrepancy. CIT's 
argument that there could be a number of individuals who would 
have chosen not to bid at the Trustee's Sale because they 
believed it was invalid is unconvincing. 
CIT also attempts to avoid the reach of Utah cases using 
estoppel in nonjudicial foreclosure actions by distinguishing 
between a defect in the notice of default and a defect in the 
notice of sale. CIT argues that the Utah cases using estoppel in 
nonjudicial foreclosure actions deal with defects in the notice 
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of sale, not the notice of default, as is the case here. Using 
this distinction, CIT contends that the equitable principle of 
estoppel cannot be used where there is a defect in the notice of 
default because the trustee has no power to conduct a sale until 
a valid notice of default is given. 
CIT's argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, 
there is nothing in the plain language of § 57-1-24 that 
indicates a defect in the notice of default will void a sale, but 
a defect in the notice of sale will not. In fact, the statute 
not only preconditions a trustee's exercise of his power of sale 
on getting a notice of default filed, but it also preconditions 
the exercise of the power on getting a notice of sale filed as 
well. See § 57-1-24(3) ("after the lapse of at least three 
months the trustee shall give notice of sale . . . " ) . If CIT's 
reasoning is correct, then a defect in the notice of sale would 
also void the sale. However, this is not the case under Utah law 
and CIT has failed to give any persuasive reason why a deficient 
notice of default should be treated differently than a deficient 
notice of sale for purposes of the validity of the sale. 
Secondly, at least one Utah case has involved a deficient 
notice of default and the court applied the same standards used 
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with a deficient notice of sale. In Occident/Nebraska Federal 
Savings Bank, the Utah Court of Appeals held that an incomplete 
description of the property in the notice of default did not void 
the sale because the notice of default still provided sufficient 
notice and met the objectives of the statute. 791 P.2d at 220-
21. Therefore, CIT's attempt to find a relevant distinction 
between a notice of default and a notice of sale is unsupported 
both by the plain language of the statute and Utah case law. 
Finally, CIT argues that allowing a valid sale to be based 
on a deficient notice of default wi]] create a "shadow notice 
system" that will eliminate the predictability and uniformity of 
the statutory notice system. Contrary to CIT's contention, using 
the principles of estoppel does not establish a "shadow notice 
system" nor does it affect the predictability of the notice 
system. Parties continue to be obligated to comply with the 
statutory requirements for nonjudicial foreclosures. However, 
"[t]lle purpose of strict notice requirements in a nonjudicial 
sale of property secured by trust deed is to inform persons with 
an interest in the property of the pending sale of that property, 
so that they may act to protect those interests." Timm, 2003 UT 
at f 36. Where a party receives notice of the pending sale and 
49 
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has an opportunity to protect its interests by objecting to the 
sale, but chooses instead to silently allow the sale to take 
place, equity will not allow that party to complain about the 
known defect after the sale is complete. This equitable 
principle does not affect the predictability of the statutory 
process, but simply prevents a party from complaining about a 
defective notice when the party had all the notice it needed to 
protect its rights. 
The Court has examined the rest of CIT's arguments and finds 
them to be unpersuasive. Because CIT acquiesced in the Trustee's 
Sale despite having actual notice of the Cancellation of Default 
and the opportunity to protect its interests in the property, CIT 
is estopped from asserting noncompliance with the statute based 
on the Cancellation of Default. 
Therefore, for the above reasons, the Court GRANTS RJW's 
motion for summary judgment and DENIES CIT's cross-motion for 
summary j udgment. 
The court believes this goes only to the declaratory and 
injunctive relief claims. Neither party briefed the title claims 
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and the court believes the slander of title claim was dismissed 
against Southwestern Title but not against CIT. 
2. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SOUTHWESTERN 
TITLE'S CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
BACKGROUND 
On January 24, 2001, certain property in Park City (the 
"Property") was encumbered by a deed of trust ("IndyMac Trust 
Deed") executed in favor of IndyMac Ban), F.S.B. ("IndyMac"). 
Subsequently, the debtor defaulted on the IndyMac Trust Deed and 
IndyMac Bank caused a notice of default (the "Notice of Default") 
to be recorded On October 8, 2003. On July 28, 2004, RJW entered 
into an agreement (the "Assignment Agreement") with Deutsche Bank 
National Trust Company ("Deutsche Bank") whereby, inter alia, the 
beneficial interest of the IndyMac Trust Deed was transferred to 
RJW. The Assignment Agreement prohibited Deutsche from pursuing 
any collection efforts under the loan and contained an 
indemnification provision whereby RJW agreed to hold Deutsche and 
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its directors, officers, employees, attorneys and agents harmless 
from any claims that arose in connection with the subject of the 
transaction. 
At the time RJW purchased the IndyMac Trust Deed, 
Southwestern Title was the record trustee. On August 9, 2006, 
RJW recorded an Assignment of Trust Deed (the "Assignment Deed") 
stating that Deutsche Bank was assigning its beneficial rights 
and interest in the IndyMac Trust Deed to RJW. At the top of the 
Assignment Deed, the following notation was inscribed: 
After recording mail to: 
First Southwestern Title Agency of Utah, Inc. 
102 West 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Despite the notation, the parties dispute where the 
Assignment Deed was mailed after recording. Southwestern Title 
contends that the deed was sent to RJW's attorneys and offers the 
policy and records of the Summit County Recorder as proof. RJW 
relies on the notation as evidence that the Assignment Deed was 
sent to Southwestern Title. IndyMac never informed Southwestern 
Title about the assignment and RJW did not inform Southwestern 
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Title about the assignment until November 16, 2004. 
On September 22, 2004, pursuant to instructions from 
Deutsche Bank, Southwestern Title recorded a Cancellation of 
Notice of Default ("Cancellation of Default"^ The parties 
dispute whether Southwestern Title was aware that RJW was the 
beneficiary at the time the Cancellation of Default was recorded. 
Southwestern Title did not obtain a title update before recording 
the Cancellation of Default or inquire as to whether the default 
had actually been cured because it was not an industry standard 
to do either of these things. 
On December 13, 2004, a trustee's sale was held on the 
IndyMac Trust Deed. Several months later, The CIT Group/Consumer 
Finance, Inc. ("CIT"), who was a beneficiary on a second trust 
deed on the Property, informed RJW that it considered the 
trustee's sale invalid because of the Cancellation of Default. 
CIT then recorded its own notice of default and RJW filed this 
action mi July 20, 2005 to enjoin CIT from foreclosing on the 
Property. 
In addition to filing suit against CIT, RJW also sued 
Southwestern Title for slander of title and breach of duty. RJW 
subsequently agreed to the dismissal of its slander of title 
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claim. The Court now has before it RJW s motion for summary 
judgment and Southwestern Title's cross-motion for summary 
judgment. 
ARGUMENTS 
RJW claims in its motion for summary judgment that as 
trustee of the IndyMac Trust Deed, Southwestern Title owed RJW a 
duty to act "reasonably and in good faith," and at a minimum, 
this included complying with the provisions of the trust deed and 
the trust deed statute. The trust deed statute authorizes a 
cancellation of default only if the default is cured and the 
trust deed is reinstated. Because Southwestern Title failed to 
ensure that these two conditions were met, it breached its duty 
as a matter of law. 
Southwestern Title filed an opposition to RJW's motion as 
well as a cross-motion for summary judgment on May 25, 2006. 
Southwestern Title contends that Utah law treats breach of duty 
claims as negligence claims and that summary judgment is 
inappropriate to resolve a negligence claim on its merits except 
in the most clear cut cases. It is not clear cut in this case 
because Southwestern Title did not know that RJW had become the 
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beneficiary when it followed Deutsche Bank's instructions to 
record the Cancellation of Default. 
Summary judgment is further inappropriate for RJW because it 
is not clear what standard of care should be applied. Where the 
standard of care is in question, summary judgment should not be 
granted unless the standard is fixed by law and reasonable minds 
could reach but one conclusion as to defendant's liability. 
Neither of these conditions are met. 
Moreover, summary judgment is inappropriate where, as here, 
there n^ questions as to reasonableness and qood faith. 
Southwestern Title acted reasonably and in good faith because it 
had no way of knowing thai RJW was the beneficiary nm] it iunl no 
statutory or industry obligation to question Deutsche Bank's 
instructions or obtain a title search before recording the 
Cancellation of Default. 
Finally, Southwestern Title contends that summary judgment 
is inappropriate because RJW has failed to provide any evidence 
that is has been harmed, other than its attorney fees incurred in 
this action. h 1W cannot recover attorney fees because it has no 
contractual or statutory right to do so, and further, claims in 
negligence for economic loss such as attorney fees are barred by 
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the economic loss rule. 
Southwestern Title then argues that while summary judgment 
is inappropriate for RJW, summary judgment in favor of 
Southwestern Title should be granted as a matter of law. 
Southwestern Title contends that summary judgment should be 
granted because RJW cannot prove the breach of duty element of 
its claim. First, Southwestern Title's primary duty as a trustee 
was to ensure payment on the deed of trust and exercise the power 
of trustee's sale if the trustor defaults. RJW contends that the 
trustee's sale was valid and therefore, Southwestern Title has 
not breached its duty. 
Even if the sale was invalid, Southwestern Title acted 
reasonably under the circumstances because it was never informed 
that Deutsche Bank was no longer the beneficiary. RJW does not 
dispute that Southwestern Title acted in accordance with industry 
standards when it did not question Deutsche Bank's instructions 
to record the Cancellation of Default and therefore its actions 
were reasonable as a matter of law. 
Moreover, RJW should have known that a Cancellation of 
Default would be filed because the Assignment Agreement between 
RJW and Deutsche Bank required Deutsche Bank to cease all 
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collection efforts against the debtor. 
Southwestern Title contends that summary judgment should 
also be granted in its favor because RJW cannot show any harm 
that it incurred, other than attorney fees. Because RJW has no 
contractual or statutory right to collect attorney fees and 
because attorney fees are barred by the economic loss rule, RJW 
cannot prove any damages. In addition, RJW cannot recover 
attorney fees as special damages because special damages are only 
available in a slander of title claim and RJW dismissed its 
slander of title claim. 
Moreover, RJW failed to mitigate its damages and its damages 
are a result of its own failure. RJW and its attorneys failed to 
obtain an updated title report that would have revealed the 
Cancellation of Default and the successor trustee of the IndyMac 
Bank Trust Deed admits that it violated industry standards by not 
doing so. 
Finally, I UJ cannot show harm because it agreed to hold 
Deusche Bank and its agents harmless in connection with the 
Property. As an agent of Deutsche Bank, Southwestern Title is 
covered by this provision in the Assignment Agreement and 
therefore RJW cannot maintain this action against Southwestern 
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RJW filed a reply memorandum on June 7, 2006. RJW responds 
that summary judgment is appropriate because the standard of care 
is fixed by the trust deed statute. The statute requires that a 
cancellation of notice of default only be recorded where the 
default is cured and the trust deed is reinstated. This gives a 
fixed standard of care that requires a trustee to verify that the 
default has been cured. Southwestern Title breached this duty 
and therefore summary judgment is appropriate. 
RJW also contends that RJW may recover attorney fees as 
special damages because they resulted in a cloud on RJW's title. 
The Cancellation of Default was the sole basis on which CIT 
claimed that the sale was invalid and Southwestern Title's 
actions in filing it were the direct cause of the litigation with 
CIT. 
RJW filed an opposition memorandum to Southwestern Title's 
cross-motion for summary judgment on June 12, 2006. RJW argues 
that summary judgment is inappropriate for Southwestern Title 
because a trustee has the statutory duty to ensure that the 
underlying default has been cured before the trustee may cancel 
the notice of default. Southwestern Title breached this duty by 
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failing to inquire whether the default had been cured. 
RJW also disputes that Southwestern Title was an agent of 
Deutsche Bank. To establish an agency relationship, Southwestern 
Title must show a fiduciary relationship with Deutsche Bank and 
it has failed to do so. Therefore, Southwestern Title is not 
protected by the terms of the Assignment Agreement. 
Finally, RJW contends that it did suffer harm from the 
Cancellation of Default because it placed a cloud on its title 
and therefore it can recover its attorney fees as special 
damages. In addition, both its actions and the successor 
trustee's actions were reasonable under the circumstances and 
therefore summary ji idgment cannot be granted based on a failure 
to mitigate. 
Southwestern Title filed a reply memorandum on June 22, 
2006. Southwestern Title contends that there is no issue of 
material fact as to whether Southwestern Title breached its duty 
because RJW has failed to provide any evidence disputing 
Southwestern Title7s expert affidavits that Southwestern Title 
acted reasonably :i i: :n ] i • j \ i t : »f :i ndustry standards . . 1 las also 
failed to provide any evidence that Southwestern Title had notice 
that RJW was the beneficiary. 
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Southwestern Title also contends that it was clearly an 
agent for Deutsche Bank and therefore cannot be sued by RJW. 
Agency exists where a party acts on behalf of, and under the 
control of, a principal. Southwestern Title acted on behalf of 
Deutsche Bank and therefore RJW must hold it harmless under its 
Assignment Agreement with Deutsche Bank. 
Finally, Southwestern Title argues that RJW cannot prove it 
is entitled to special damages because special damages are only 
available under a slander of title claim. In addition, RJW 
failed to mitigate its damages. RJW has failed to submit any 
evidence disputing that industry standards require that the 
successor trustee update the title at the time he becomes 
successor trustee. The law is clear that a plaintiff has the 
duty to mitigate its damages and because RJW failed to do so, he 
cannot recover any damages arising from that failure. 
DISCUSSION 
Summary Judgment is appropriate only if the pleadings, 
depositions, affidavits, and other submissions reflect no genuine 
issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. UTAH R. CIV. P. 56©) . The purpose 
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of summary judgment "is to eliminate the time, trouble and 
expense of trial when upon any view taken of the facts as 
asserted by the party ruled against, he would not be entitled to 
prevail." Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975). 
A non-moving party who bares the burden of proof at trial must 
produce evidence sufficient to meet each element of their claim 
to preclude the entry of summary judgment. Sanns v. Butterfield 
Ford, 94 P.3d 301, 304 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). 
I. RJW' s Motion for Summary Judgment 
Both parties agree that RJW's breach of duty claim should be 
treated as a negligence claim. See Wycalis v. Guardian Title of 
Utah, /•>=; M R?i . B9R m+-av, ct. App. 1989) (stating that the 
breach of duty claim by a beneficiary against a trustee amounted 
to a negligence claim). Both parties also agree that summary 
judgment should only be granted if the applicable standard of 
care is "fixed by law, and reasonable minds could reach but one 
conclusion as to the defendant's negligence under the 
circumstances. White v. Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371, 1374 (Utah 
1994) (quoting Wycalis, 780 P.2d at 825). The parties dispute, 




u[T]he applicable standard of care in a given case may be 
established, as a matter of law, by legislative enactment or 
prior judicial decision." Wycalis, 780 P.2d at 825. Neither 
party points to any prior judicial decision as establishing the 
standard of care, but RJW contends a fixed standard of care is 
established by Utah Code Annotated §§ 57-1-24 and 57-1-31. 
Section 57-1-24 provides that a trustee may not exercise his 
power of sale until certain acts such as filing a notice of 
default and a notice of sale are completed. Section 57-1-31(1) 
details how an existing default may be cured. After detailing 
how a default may be cured, the provision states that M[a]fter 
the beneficiary or beneficiary's successor in interest has been 
5
 Southwestern Title seemingly argues against itself on the 
point. In its opposition memorandum, it contends that there is 
no standard of care fixed by law and that in the absence of a 
fixed standard of care, it is a question for the fact finder and 
therefore summary judgment cannot be granted. However, in its 
memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment, 
Southwestern Title contends that it met its primary duty under 
the trust deed statute and therefore its summary judgment motion 
should be granted. The implication of this second argument is 
that Southwestern Title does in fact believe the standard of care 
is fixed and that it met the appropriate standard. Although 
Southwestern Title is free to make inconsistent arguments such as 




paid and the default cured, the obligation and trust deed shall 
be reinstated as if no acceleration had occurred." Subsection 
(2) then states that: 
[i]f the default is cured and the trust 
deed reinstated . . . the trustee shall execute, 
acknowledge, and deliver a cancellation of the 
recorded notice of default under the trustee 
deed; and any trustee who refuses to execute and 
record this cancellation within 30 days is 
liable to the person curing the default for all 
actual damages resulting from this refusal. 
RJW contends that these provisions require' a trustee to do 
more than simply rely on a beneficiary's instructions to record a 
notice of cancellation of default, it requires that the trustee 
take some action to determine whether the default has actually 
been cured. 
However, there is nothing in the plain language of § 57-1-31 
that indicates what steps, if any, a trustee must take to ensure 
that the default has actually been cured. Although the statute 
states that a trustee is liable for refusing to record a notice 
of cancellation, the statute notably gives no penalties for a 
trustee that records a notice of cancellation where the default 
has not been cured. There is simply nothing in the plain language 
of the statute showing that the legislature intended to provide a 
standard of care that requires a trustee who has received 
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instructions from a beneficiary to cancel a notice of default to 
take affirmative action to determine if the default has actually 
been cured. Without something more, this Court is unwilling to 
find a fixed standard of care based on a statute that says 
nothing about a trustee's duty to verify that the default has 
been cured. 
This conclusion is supported by the decision in Wycalis. In 
Wycalis, a trustee reconveyed a trust deed to the trustor based 
on a forged request for reconveyance. 780 P.2d at 822-23. The 
trustee did not contact the beneficiary to verify her request nor 
did it require delivery of the original promissory note or trust 
deed. Id. at 823. The beneficiary sued the trustee claiming it 
had breached its duty by reconveying her trust deed based on the 
forged request. Id. 
One of the issues addressed by the court was whether a 
trustee standard of care had been fixed by the trust deed 
statute. Wycalis, 780 P.2d at 825. The beneficiary argued that 
§ 57-1-33 provided a fixed standard of care for a trustee.6 Id. 
at 826, n.7. The beneficiary relied on language in the provision 
that stated that "when the obligation secured by any trust deed 
6
 Section 57-1-33 was repealed in 1994.. 
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has been satisfied, the trustee shall, upon written request by 
the beneficiary, reconvey the trust property." Id. The 
beneficiary contended that because the obligation had not been 
satisfied, the trustee breached its duty by reconveying the trust 
property based on the forged request. Id. 
The court surmised that the beneficiary was essentially 
arguing that the statute subjected trustees to a strict liability 
standard. Wycalis, 780 P.2d at 826, n.7. The court then noted 
that the legislature had gone to great lengths in § 57-1-33 to 
define the duties of the beneficiary and the resulting liability 
for the breach of those duties, but failed to address any duties 
or resulting liabilities for a trustee who reconveyed property 
before the obligation was satisfied. Id. The court further 
stated that the language regarding the trustee was likely 
intended only as a procedural guide for trustees. Id. In light 
of these facts, the court concluded that it was unwilling to find 
a strict liability standard of care for trustees where the 
legislature did not expressly provide for one. Id. Because the 
court found no fixed standard of care provided by a legislative 
enactment or prior judicial opinion, the court held that summary 
judgment was inappropriate and that the standard of care should 
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be determined through fact finding. Id. 
The beneficiary's argument in Wycalis and RJWs argument are 
closely related and the reasoning applied to the statutory 
provision in Wycalis applies to the statutory provisions at issue 
here. As with the beneficiary in Wycalis, RJW wishes to find a 
fixed standard of care in a statutory provision that does not 
expressly purport to establish one. As with the court in 
Wycalis, this Court declines to find a fixed standard of care 
where there is insufficient evidence that a legislature intended 
to provide one. Because RJW has not offered any other evidence 
besides the statute for finding a fixed standard of care that 
would favor RJW, 
RJW's motion for summary judgment is DENIED. 
II. Southwestern Title's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment 
The next issue before the Court is Southwestern Title's 
cross-motion for summary judgment. As discussed above, in the 
absence of a standard of care fixed by prior judicial opinion or 
legislative enactment, the standard of care is normally a factual 
i 
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question that makes summary judgment inappropriate. Indeed, in 
Wycalis, the Utah Court of Appeals found there was no fixed 
standard of care for a trustee's duty in relation to a request 
for reconveyance and therefore reversed the trial court's grant 
of summary judgment and remanded the matter for the fact finder 
to determine the appropriate standard of care. 
The result from Wycalis would seem to compel the conclusion 
that Southwestern Title's cross-motion should also be denied 
since there is no fixed standard of care by prior judicial 
opinion or legislative enactment. However, there is one critical 
difference in this matter that distinguishes it from Wycalis. 
Unlike Wycalisf there is undisputed evidence of the industry 
standard of care in this case. 
In Wycalis, the court stated that the standard of care 
should be established factually, with an emphasis on standard-of-
care-in-the-industry evidence. 780 P.2d at 826. The court also 
indicated that expert testimony would be particularly helpful in 
delineating the appropriate standard of care. Id. at 826, n.8. 
Moreover, the Wycalis court stated that the matter was not 
"conducive to an yas a matter of law' determination, especially 
in the absence of uncontroverted standard-of'-the-industry 
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evidence." Id. at 825 (emphasis added). Wycalis therefore left 
the door open for the possibility that summary judgment may be 
appropriate where a case involved "uncontroverted standard-of-
the-industry evidence." 
It appears that such uncontroverted evidence is present in 
this case. In Southwestern Title's statement of undisputed 
material facts, 1 15 states that "[Southwestern Title] did not 
obtain a title report before recording the [Cancellation of 
Default] because it is not an industry standard to do so." RJW 
wrote in response to this paragraph in its opposition memorandum, 
"Undisputed." 
Paragraph 16 of Southwestern Title's statement of undisputed 
material facts further states that "[i]t is not the custom or 
practice for a trustee to obtain a title report before recording 
a Cancellation of Notice of Default or to question the authority 
of the purported beneficiary." In response to this statement of 
fact, RJW responded "Disputed, insofar as the Trust Deed Statute 
imposes a clear duty upon a trustee to ensure that the debt 
underlying a trust deed has been paid and the default cured prior 
to a trustee's issuance of a cancellation of notice of default" 
(emphasis added). A plain reading of this response indicates 
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that RJW disputed the statement only to the extent that the trust 
deed statute imposes a duty to ensure the default has been cured. 
RJW apparently does not dispute that the custom or practice is 
not to question the authority of the purported beneficiary, but 
simply that the trust deed statute overrides the industry custom. 
As has already been discussed, RJW's argument that the trust 
deed statute provides such a duty has been rejected. Therefore, 
if it is true that RJW does not dispute that the industry trade 
or custom is not to obtain a title report when recording a notice 
of cancellation of default or question a purported beneficiary's 
authority to request such a recording, then there is no reason to 
send the matter to the fact finder to determine the industry 
trade or custom. 
Even if RJW does dispute that this is the industry trade or 
custom, RJW has offered no evidence to support this dispute. On 
the other hand, Southwestern Title has offered evidence to 
support its claim for what is the industry custom or practice. 
Southwestern Title provided an affidavit from Melven E. Smith 
("Mr. Smith77) , the owner of Westland Title Insurance Agency. Mr. 
Smith states in his affidavit that he has "personally acted as a 
trustee in the foreclosure of thousands of Deeds of Trust" and 
-39-
that it is not the practice in the industry to "question the 
instruction from the lender to cancel a Notice of Default" nor 
"is it the practice in the industry for a trustee to search title 
before recording" such a document. Southwestern Title also 
offers an affidavit from Kathy A. Davis ("Ms. Davis"), the 
manager of the foreclosure department for First American Title 
Insurance Agency. Ms. Davis states that in her experience, 
trustees follow instructions from the beneficiary to cancel a 
notice of default and that it is not First American's standard 
practice to search title before recording the cancellation 
notice. 
Southwestern Title's evidence as to the industry practice 
regarding the filing of a notice of cancellation of default 
places the burden on RJW to provide evidence to the contrary if 
it wishes to dispute the alleged industry practice. RJW, 
however, has failed to provide any such evidence. Because RJW 
seemingly does not dispute the industry practice is to accept 
instructions from a beneficiary to cancel a notice of default 
without making any further investigation, there is no need for 
the fact finder to determine the standard of care on this matter 
and it may properly be decided as a matter of law. 
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However, despite the undisputed evidence of the appropriate 
standard of care for a trustee recording a cancellation notice, 
if Southwestern Title had actual7 notice that Deutsche Bank was 
no longer the beneficiary, then summary judgment would be 
inappropriate. 
RJW's sole evidence that Southwestern Title had notice that 
RJW was the beneficiary is that the Assignment Deed stated that 
after it had been recorded, it should be sent to Southwestern 
Title.8 To dispute that it was sent to Southwestern Title, 
Southwestern Title offers correspondence from the Summit County 
Recorder stating that it is the policy of Summit County to return 
the original recorded document to the party that requested the 
recording, even if the face of the document expressly instructs 
7
 Although the recording of the Assignment Deed clearly 
allowed Southwestern Title the opportunity to discover that 
Deutsche Bank was no longer the beneficiary, as discussed above, 
the industry standard of care does not require a trustee to do an 
updated title search before recording a cancellation of default 
and therefore the fact that the Assignment Deed was recorded 
cannot be used to show Southwestern Title breached its duty. 
8RJW also states that it never received the recorded 
Assignment Deed, but it does not offer any evidence to support 
this claim. Moreover, Southwestern Title's evidence shows that 
Wrona & Parrish received it, not that RJW received it. Therefore 
RJW's unsupported contention that it never received the 
Assignment Deed is inapposite. 
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that the document be sent to another party. Southwestern Title 
also points to records from the Summit County Recorder's office 
that indicates that the Assignment Deed was to be sent to Wrona & 
Parrish PC and lists Wrona & Parrish PC's address. Finally, 
Southwestern Title offers deposition testimony that Southwestern 
Title never received the recorded document. 
The Court finds that in light of Summit County's stated 
policy of sending the recorded document back to the original 
party even where the document says to do otherwise,9 the Summit 
County records showing that the document was to be sent to Wrona 
& Parrish PC, and deposition testimony that Southwestern Title 
did not receive the Assignment Deed, the only reasonable 
inference is that Southwestern Title did not receive the 
Assignment Deed. Because the Assignment Deed is the only 
evidence that RJW offers to show Southwestern Title knew that 
Deutsche Bank was no longer the beneficiary, the Court finds that 
RJW has failed to create an issue of fact on whether Southwestern 
Title had notice. Since Southwestern Title did not have notice 
9
 Summit County will send a recorded document to an 
alternative party if there was a self-addressed stamped envelope 




that Deutsche Bank was no longer the beneficiary and the industry 
standard of care did not require Southwestern Title to question 
Deutsche Bank's instructions or do an updated title search, 
Southwestern Title did not breach its duty as a trustee as a 
matter of law.10 
Therefore, for the above reasons, Southwestern Title's 
cross-motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. 
3. SOUTHWESTERN TITLE'S MOTION FOR ALLOCATION OF FEES/ 
BACKGROUND 
On February 28, 2006, RJW responded to Southwestern Title's 
Request for Admission No. 2 and admitted that the original 
Assignment of Trust Deed recorded July 28, 2004 was returned to 
Wrona & Parrish and not Southwestern Title. Southwestern Title 
thereafter deposed S. Blake Parrish ("Mr. Parrish")f an attorney 
and trustee who worked at Wrona & Parrish. Southwestern Title 
Because the Court finds that Southwestern Title did not 
breach its duty as a matter of law, the Court does not address 
Southwestern Title's other arguments for summary judgment. 
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did not ask Mr. Parrish certain questions regarding the receipt 
of the Assignment of Trust Deed because the matter had been 
admitted. 
Subsequently, RJW filed a motion to withdraw its admission 
that Wrona & Parrish had received the Assignment of Trust Deed. 
After full briefing and oral argument, this Court granted RJWs 
motion to withdraw its admission and allowed the parties to do 
additional discovery in light of the Court's decision, but stated 
that "[t]he court will not foreclose a request by [Southwestern 
Title] for allocation of cost and fees associated with this 
additional discovery required." 
Following this Court's decision, Southwestern Title served a 
Second Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Production of 
Documents and Requests for Admissions ("Additional Discovery 
Request"). Southwestern Title now brings this motion to allocate 
the fees and costs incurred in drafting and serving its 
Additional Discovery Request and in bringing the current motion. 
ARGUMENTS 
Southwestern Title claims that it is entitled to its costs 
and fees incurred in drafting and serving its Additional 
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Discovery Request and its current motion because if RJW had not 
admitted it received the Assignment of Trust Deed and then 
withdrawn its admission, Southwestern Title would not have 
incurred these costs. RJW filed an opposition memorandum on 
August 4, 2006. RJW claims that Southwestern Title is not 
entitled to its costs and fees because RJW and Mr. Parrish saved 
time by voluntarily gathering and delivering additional documents 
to Southwestern Title in response to Southwestern Title's 
discovery requests. RJW also claims that Southwestern Title's 
Additional Discovery Request is "standard litigation fare and the 
very kinds of questions that chew up hours of deposition time." 
Southwestern Title filed a reply memorandum on August 11, 2006 
and disputed that RJW7 s manner of discovery saved any time or 
resources. 
DISCUSSION 
RJW essentially makes two arguments for why Southwestern 
Title should not receive its costs and fees incurred in its 
Additional Discovery Request and in bringing its motion. RJW 
first argues that Southwestern Title's motion has no relation to 
conducting the additional discovery. RJW secondly argues that 
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RJW and Mr. Parrish 'Voluntarily collected and delivered 
[additional responsive documents] to various discovery requests 
from [Southwestern Title]" and because Southwestern Title's 
Additional Discovery Request would have taken up hours of 
deposition time, Southwestern Title did not have to expend any 
extra time or resources.11 
Neither of these arguments, however, justify denying 
Southwestern Title's motion for costs and fees. Without RJW's 
mistaken admission, Southwestern Title would not have had to 
serve its Additional Discovery Request or bring this motion. 
Although RJW contends that the manner in which discovery 
proceeded actually saved time, it offers no evidence12 or 
persuasive argument that time was actually saved. This Court 
finds that Southwestern Title should not have to pay for RJW's 
pleading mistake. 
11
 RJW also contends that Mr. Parrish offered to collect 
documents for Southwestern Title's review, but Southwestern Title 
declined the offer. The Court finds this fact irrelevant since 
Southwestern Title was still relying on RJW's mistaken admission 
at the time it declined Mr. Parrish's offer. 
12
 Indeed, while RJW contends that XAa review of [Southwestern 
Title's] supplemental discovery requests reveals that those 
requests are standard litigation fare and the very kinds of 
questions that chew up hours of deposition time," RJW does not 
attach a copy of the discovery requests or give any indication as 
to the content of the questions. 
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Therefore, for the above reasons, Southwestern Title's 
Motion for Allocation of Fees is GRANTED. 
The court finds that the amount of $537.50 for the costs and 
fees incurred in the Additional Discovery Request and in bringing 
the current motion is reasonable. 
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the Court and no other 
order is required. 
DATED this Ly day of September, 2006, 
BY TSE^COUST: 
i / 
BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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